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This study is an examination of the public imaging of gay 
men and lesbians during the latter part of the twentieth and 
early part of the twenty-first centuries.  The study looks at 
public imaging as it is performed in the service of the 
political aims of gay people, with an eye towards the kinds of 
tensions and erasures that occur when one monolithic identity is 
promoted.  Through these examinations, I create a kind of 
contemporary history of the gay political rights movement. 
 In the study, I examine theoretical approaches to identity 
from several postmodern theorists and then use these approaches 
to support my work in the three chapters.  In each chapter I 
focus on one site of gay identity performances: Southern 
Decadence in New Orleans, the murder of Matthew Shepard, and the 
decriminalization of sodomy.  At each site, I examine the event, 
the various identities presented, and the tensions and erasures 
that result from the specific identity performances.  In 
conclusion, I envision a political movement which is inclusive 
of multiple identities – not just those which fit a 






GAY IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 
 
 The notion of the melting pot into which the specific 
cultures of immigrant citizens are thrown is a powerful mythic 
image in this country. While the romanticized version of the 
immigrant who has divested foreign influences in order to forge 
a new American identity is certainly compelling, cultural 
critics have found such a monolithic identity to be problematic, 
at best.  In becoming American, individuals and groups may find 
their cultures being erased.  Becoming American almost seems a 
metaphor for accepting the majority’s view and the majority’s 
culture.  In the acceptance of that view, however, an ethnic or 
social minority group finds that their political power is lost – 
consumed by the political will of the majority. 
Since the dawn of the American history, groups of people 
have united around an identity for the purposes of achieving 
public political gains.  In this study, I explore gay group 
identity and its role in the public sphere.  I examine three 
sites at and around which gay people have promoted an identity 
and the political aims that are related to each of the sites.  
Specifically, I examine gay public relations as manifest in 
attempts to self-fashion a group image for political ends. Using 
Southern Decadence in New Orleans, the murder of Matthew 
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Shephard, and the decriminalization of sodomy, my examination 
has two axes: 1) the fashioning of an image to be presented to 
the mainstream, and 2) the in-group tensions and self-policing 
that occur as a result of the public imaging.   At these three 
sites, it is possible to uncover and examine differing 
conceptions of gay identity, different political strategies, and 
different images of gay people.   
  Recently, cultural studies scholars have questioned the 
use of monolithic identities as poles around which to activate 
groups for political purposes. For instance, Judith Butler 
writes, 
[ . . . ] identity categories tend to be instruments of 
regulatory regimes, whether as the normalizing categories 
of oppressive structures or as the rallying points for a 
liberatory contestation of that very oppression. 
(“Imitation” 13) 
Butler recognizes the “normalizing” nature of identity 
groupings.  Popular understanding of gay people, for instance, 
suggests that they all are socially liberal; however, some 
members of the Log Cabin Republicans1 are social conservatives on 
issues they see as unrelated to gay rights.  Butler seems to 
also see the political (contestatory) potential of identity 
groupings (even though the “rallying points” are also written 
off as “regulatory regimes”).  In the politics of our “actually-
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existing democracy”,2 all kinds of identity groups have found 
that coming together for the purpose of political activism is an 
effective strategy.   
The advancements in gay rights in the last part of the 
twentieth and first part of the twenty-first centuries prove 
this point.  Having begun as part of the political left, gay 
activism took a dramatically different turn near the end of the 
AIDS crisis.3  After coming out of the closet and taking to the 
streets to demand recognition of gay people, political 
consciousness increased as did attention to public self-
fashioning – that is to say, fashioning images of gays for 
mainstream consumption.  Within the community, self-fashioning 
for public consumption created tensions surrounding proper 
images for presentation, as well as concern about the erasures 
caused by the presentation of these images.  This project aims 
to create a contemporary history of the gay political movement 
through examining three sites of such self-fashioning to uncover 
the political strategies behind the self-fashioning as well as 
the tensions and erasures resulting from public imaging. 
 
E Pluribus Unum: The Deconstructive Project and Identity 
Performance in the Public Sphere 
 
Banding together in a group for the purposes of political 
action seems to be antithetical to one of the country’s most 
common mottoes: E Pluribus Unum.4 The phrase is variously 
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translated as “One Unity Composed of Many Parts” (Murray, par. 
8), “One Out of Many,” or “Out of the Many—One” (“FAQs,” 
question 7).  Reading the various translations of this phrase 
reveals two competing mythic images of America: the myth of the 
melting pot and the myth of a pluralist society.   
The translation provided by the U.S. Treasury on its 
website (“One Out of Many”) is most indicative of the American 
myth of the melting pot.  According to government documents, 
especially one written by the Department of State in 2003, the 
motto represents the fact that many states are combined to form 
one union (“The Great Seal,” 15).  We should probably be 
surprised that Congress required the motto be printed on our 
currency – given the anti-federalist stances of many of the 
country’s founders.  The official translation suggests that the 
governments of the many states are subsumed by the federal 
government.  The Great Seal is quite clear in its federalist 
intents — these thirteen states are part of one central federal 
government, ruled by a chief.  In considering the motto as it 
might apply to the citizenry of the United States, I find it 
essentially idealistic, suggesting that many voices can, in 
fact, merge, somehow becoming one voice speaking the will of the 
people – the majoritarian melting pot, if you will.  
The second translation, “One Unity Composed of Many Parts” 
(Murray, par. 8), suggests a different reading: a pluralist 
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notion of America. One Unity Composed of Many Parts, as a 
pluralist statement, reads almost as if it were meant to support 
current proponents of multi-culturalism.  Their argument is 
that, despite the also prominent myth of the melting pot, groups 
of people (immigrants, African-Americans, gays), in fact, have 
histories and cultures all their own.  Each of these cultures 
forms one part of the American cultural landscape.  Rather than 
an American fondue, if you will, all of these cultures mix to 
make a stew – the vegetables retaining their color, their shape, 
and their individuality.  In his book on the incorporation of 
ethnic immigrants into American society, The American 
Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity and Civic Culture, Lawrence Fuchs 
describes current America as a society “in which individuals are 
free to express their ethnic interests within a framework of 
civic culture” so that ethnic diversity becomes a source of 
civic unity (xviii).   
The two readings inform, I think, the battle over “identity 
politics” within the American public sphere.5  In a democratic 
melting pot, the majority rules, and minority voices are 
subsumed – the identity of the majority becomes the American 
identity.  The particular political desires of the minority are 
not addressed. In a pluralistic democracy, on the other hand, 
groups maintain their identities (or cultures) as points around 
which to group together and achieve their political aims.  
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However, the danger in identity groupings so adequately pointed 
out by Judith Butler is the erasure of individual identities in 
service of those normalizing regimes. Moreover, tensions are 
engendered over the “proper” public image to put forward in 
order to achieve the particular political aim. 
In an article which, in part, discusses scholarship of the 
Black diaspora, Cornel West argues against the essentializing 
nature of the identity category “Black,” as if the term itself 
can somehow encompass the identities of all of the people within 
the category.  He writes, 
Any notions of “the real Black community” and “positive 
images” are value-laden, socially-loaded and ideologically-
charged. To pursue this discussion is to call into question 
the possibility of such an uncontested consensus regarding 
them. (73) 
Similarly, the identity category “American” is also a category 
in which non-majority political voices are lost.  The major 
contribution, I think, of postmodern theory is to call into 
question the nature of identity categories.  To continue with 
West’s line of reasoning, such categories are politically and 
culturally constructed.   
  The essentializing nature of identity categories is true, 
of course for gay identities as well.  For instance, some 
bisexuals have been vocal in their opposition to being included 
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in a group that, by its very name, erases their identities.  A 
recent article in The Advocate (a nationally distributed gay and 
lesbian magazine) reported that universities are now seeing the 
emergence of new bisexual student groups because, as one student 
at Dallas’s Southern Methodist University related, “There’s no 
room for the grayness of bisexuality when gays try to fit into 
the black-and-white world of the straight mainstream” (36).   
Many gay and lesbian groups have, therefore, worked to be 
more inclusive of bisexual and transgendered people.  For 
example, the Lesbian and Gay Theatre Focus Group of the 
Association for Theatre in Higher Education recently changed its 
name to the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered Focus 
Group of the association (interestingly, dropping the reference 
to theatre altogether).  This change in name expressed a need 
for the community of people interested in the theatre of 
alternative sexualities to be more inclusive and to begin to 
address the sometimes non-inclusive history of the “gay and 
lesbian” movement.  The move to become more inclusive, to 
address inequity along political, economic, racial, or gendered 
lines, is what Alan Sinfield heralds as the beginning of the 
Post-Gay movement – a name which somehow also collapses 
distinctions into “one” (6-13). 
Granting there is no essential gay identity problematizes 
forming a collective identity for political action.  Although 
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deconstruction has directly questioned essential identities, 
Cornel West notes that its inquiries are problematic for people 
engaged in political struggle: “The major shortcoming of 
Derrida’s deconstructive project is that [ . . . ] it tends to 
preclude analyses that guide action with purpose” (75).  Judith 
Butler, on the other hand, sees a kind of liberation when one is 
freed from using an exclusionary identity as a basis for 
political action (“Feminism” 155). 
Political activism, I think, almost requires an essential 
identity. Certainly, no one identity can serve to categorize 
every gay citizen in America.  Many individual gays do not 
agree, for instance, with the goals advanced by national gay and 
lesbian political organizations.  Yet, at some level, all gay 
citizens stand to benefit from the passage of hate crimes 
legislation or the decriminalization of sodomy.  Still, an 
essential identity – one that is promoted in mainstream culture 
– creates inter-group tensions and threatens the erasure of some 
of the group members’ individual identities.  These erasures 
must be subject to critique; in a pluralist society, multiple 
identities should flourish while still allowing for coalitional 
political gestures. 
Despite the tension between the deconstructive project, 
which questions human agency, and the essentializing nature of 
an activist political stance, I use deconstruction’s tenets to 
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examine modes of identity-performance used by gays in achieving 
certain political goals.  Thus, I alleviate some of the tension 
between theory and activism.  Jill Dolan, in her book 
Geographies of Learning, accurately characterizes this divide: 
In lesbian/gay/queer studies, the theory/practice split 
opens a divide between academics and activists [ . . . ] 
activists more and more dismiss the pursuit of theoretical 
insight as elitist and irrelevant to the direct action they 
engage around [ . . . ] social issues.  (3)   
Dolan attempts to map the terrain between the theory/practice 
divide in gay and lesbian studies/activism and in theatre 
studies.  Ultimately, Dolan’s aim is to theorize how the 
practice of theatre might lead to a fuller understanding of gay 
and lesbian issues.  Like Dolan, I want to bridge the divide 
between academics and activists through an examination of 
identities as performances.   
In a blending of theory and practice, Butler seems to want 
to use the “deconstructive project” to help inform the political 
movements of minority groups.  These political movements are 
often classified under the rubric, “identity politics.”  
However, that term is all too often used to castigate political 
movements that seek some form of redress from the government.  
One such slam comes from Wendy McElroy, a regular FoxNews 
contributor who identifies herself as an individualist feminist. 
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In an article titled “Identity Politics Dismisses Shared 
Humanity,” McElroy defines identity politics as “the approach 
that views group identity as the foundation of political 
analysis and action” and names it a “politics of exclusion and 
group separation” whose movements have “wrought [something] upon 
society” (McElroy, par. 1). Where McElroy’s tone is 
antagonistic, Butler sees political emancipatory potential in 
groups of people who have banded together around a common 
identification and coins the defining term “coalitional 
politics.”  With this term, Butler hopes to suggest that 
coalitions of people may form around identities and issues while 
refuting the notion that a singular gay/lesbian category can 
describe “the constituency for which” the gay/lesbian political 
movement speaks (“Feminism” 166).  
Examining a political movement based on an identity 
grouping requires an extensive examination of the ideas 
advocated in Judith Butler’s work.  Her discussions of 
performance and the performative are central to the processes 
undertaken by gay people and the gay political movement.  
Announcing one’s gayness is a public, declarative, and thus 
performative, act, beginning one process by which gay people 
reclaim their identities.  Through use of the performative, gay 
people undertake the process of resignification, or 
reinterpreting the monolithic identity imposed upon them by the 
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mainstream culture.  This reinterpretation is central to the 
advancement of the gay political agenda. 
Butler addresses this process of resignification, and she   
suggests that we cannot determine the original meaning of the 
sign, for there are a range of “signifying possibilities that 
exceed those to which the term has been previously bound” 
(Psychic Life 94).  The debate around the use of the word 
“queer” as a descriptive term for the gay community is on point 
here.  Prior to the reclamation of the term by gay and lesbian 
theorists and gay political activists, queer was used as an 
epithet hurled at gay and lesbian individuals to mark them as 
outsiders, not part of mainstream culture.  By taking on that 
sign, gay theorists and political activists found uses for the 
term that exceeded the signifying possibilities inherent in it 
prior to its reclamation. 
One of the problems with the use of the term “queer” as it 
relates to both activism and theory is its essentializing 
nature.  “Queer” threatens to collapse the distinctions 
identified by the “and” in gay and lesbian.  Gay male identities 
and lesbian identities must be seen, I think, as separate, in 
order to avoid creating the kind of monolith that this study 
argues against.  The reader will note that, outside of the 
present discussion of the term “queer” and some references to 
political organizations such as the National Gay and Lesbian 
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Task Force and the Human Rights Campaign, I have taken great 
pains to avoid using the descriptor “gay and lesbian” primarily 
because I focus on gay male identity.   
Certainly, some political goals such as the passage of hate 
crimes legislation, state-sanctioned gay marriage, and the 
decriminalization of sodomy are common to both gay men and 
lesbians.  Thhe joining together of gays and lesbians in the 
public sphere around these goals is politically advantageous.  
On the other hand, there are some points where gay and lesbian 
political goals may be divergent.  For instance, gay men’s 
political interests are served when national organizations lobby 
the government for AIDS research funding.  Incidence of AIDS in 
lesbian populations is much lower than that of breast cancer.  
Lesbians’ political interests may be better served by lobbying 
for more breast cancer research funding.  The use of the term 
“queer” to describe these sometimes divergent identities 
threatens to collapse distinctions into one, something this 
study wants to argue against. 
My discussion of “queer” and its erasure of specific 
identities points to other erasures common in gay political 
discourse.  While clearly beholden to the African-American civil 
rights and women’s rights movements for a political roadmap, 
current cultural constructions of gay identities often erase 
gender, race, and class from gay political discussions.  For 
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instance, participation of African-Americans in Southern 
Decadence is relatively limited.  Cultural images of gay male 
African-Americans are limited to the gay best friend or the 
feminized gay male.  The choice of Matthew Shepard as a 
surrogate for hate crimes victims erases black and non-middle 
class people, while the reliance upon him as a surrogate also 
erases more gendered surrogates such as Brandon Teena (the 
transgendered man who was killed because of his relationship 
with a woman).  These erasures must be critiqued as part of any 
discussion of gay male identities.  In references to women or 
African-Americans, I call on the similarities between the 
subaltern counter-publics, but I do not want to suggest that the 
political struggles are necessarily the same.  
Butler’s work on the performative, especially as it relates 
to minority groups like women and gays, is central to the study.  
In a process similar to Butler’s resignification, the political 
project of the gay community has been to reinterpret or 
reimagine the series of codes and norms which attach to 
individuals who make the performative statement, “I am gay.”  
This study finds that a subject (or a group of subjects” can in 
fact recreate the series of codes and norms that attach to them 
when they make a performative utterance.  In fact, I would argue 
that nearly the entire gay political movement has been, in part, 
about this process of resignification.   
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Butler wants to distinguish performativity from 
performance; the act of coming out, however, is also inherently 
theatrical.  Whereas performance almost certainly requires an 
audience of some sort, the performative act can happen when no 
audience is attending to that act.  In Bodies That Matter, 
Butler references the biblical rendition of the performative – 
“Let there be light!”  According to her example, God brings 
light into being.  Thus, “by virtue of the power of a subject or 
its will [ . . . ] a phenomenon [in this case, light] is named 
into being” (Bodies 13 emphasis added).  At its heart, the 
performative act is declarative.   
When a subject calls something into being through 
declaration, he is, in fact, “[reiterating] a norm or a set of 
norms” (Bodies 12).  In other words, when one announces, “I am 
gay,” that announcement calls upon an entire, pre-existing set 
of codes, citations, or norms that inform the listener’s 
definition of the term (“gay”).  This announcement, I suggest, 
most often happens in front of audience.  This particular 
declaration also, therefore, falls within the basic definition 
of performance – an act with an intended message executed for an 
audience. 
Other performative acts may or may not fall so easily with 
the definition of the theatrical.  According to Butler,  
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[The performative] is not primarily theatrical; indeed its 
apparent theatricality is produced to the extent that its 
historicity remains dissimulated (and, conversely, its 
theatricality gains a certain inevitability given the 
impossibility of a full disclosure of its historicity). 
(Bodies 12-13) 
Butler’s use of the word, “theatricality,” crystallizes my 
point.  Two connotations of the word theatrical are at play.  
While I am using the connotation tied to performance (theatrical 
is “of the theatre), Butler’s use of the word connotes the 
hysteric nature of the performative acts, which she also calls 
“authoritative speech [acts]” (Bodies 225); the performative is 
only dramatic because we cannot define its history.  For Butler, 
we must historicize performative, declarative acts (related to 
gender and sexuality), but uncovering the history behind such an 
act is difficult, at best.  The performative becomes theatrical 
(or dramatic) because of the inability to clearly historicize 
the act.  The declarative, “I am gay,” can most certainly be 
seen as theatrical in both senses. As I later show, the 
declarative is often performed for an audience, and the term 
“gay” carries various meanings throughout history. 
 In making the declaration, a gay person is violating a 
taboo.  Butler’s examination of the Freudian incest taboo points 
to the cultural proscription against homosexuality, which has 
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ultimately led to its privatization within the public sphere.  
In Butler’s reading of Freud, the taboo against incest prompts 
two prohibitions:  the heterosexual prohibition against the 
boy’s choice of the mother as love object and the homosexual 
prohibition against the boy’s choice of the father (Gender 
Trouble 58-9).  Freud’s writings seem to hold that the 
bisexuality of human beings at birth means that the 
homosexuality taboo takes place prior to the incest taboo.  
Butler interprets Freud: 
In effect, it is not primarily the heterosexual lust for 
the mother that must be punished and sublimated, but the 
homosexual cathexis that must be subordinated to a 
culturally sanctioned heterosexuality.  (59) 
Granting Butler’s interpretation of Freud means that the 
homosexual taboo is inscribed in the process of gender 
identification from the beginning of a human’s psychic life; 
coming out, in public, questions the system of gender 
identification on which so many cultural notions are built. 
 Given all of Butler’s contributions, however, I still find 
her conception of the performative lacking a full understanding 
of the public sphere. What I will call the declarative “I am” 
happens in public.  To be clear, the performative comprises the 
declarative statement, but this particular performative, the 
declarative “I am gay,” happens in front of audience.  The 
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actor-audience dynamic is, of course, central to the idea of 
performance.  Recalling Butler’s biblical performative, one 
cannot imagine an audience (other than perhaps the ether or the 
angels, other heavenly bodies both) listening to the voice of 
God as he spoke.  While one might imagine a gay man or lesbian 
coming out, silently, to themselves, there is really no danger 
or political force in doing so.  Thus, the gay performative is 
performance, because the speaker of the “I am” is speaking to 
someone. 
Eve Sedgwyck’s Epistemology of the Closet clarifies my 
position. In the introduction to her text, she compares two 
binary separations: public/private and closet/coming out. In the 
closet, one keeps one’s identity a secret, thus keeping it 
within a culturally imagined private zone (72). When one comes 
out, one exposes his or her own identity, making what had been 
construed as private suddenly part of public discussion. I want 
to use Sedgwick’s critique of this binary separation to further 
suggest that the gay political movement has hinged on the 
ability to straddle the boundary between public and private – 
moving an identity, previously construed as private into the 
public sphere.  In short, I want to argue that the performance 
of identity in the public sphere is necessarily political. 
Throughout this study, the term political is used with 
various connotations.  Above, for instance, performing 
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identities in the public sphere is political because it happens 
in public.  Performing a specifically gay identity in the public 
sphere may be doubly political; that is to say that the 
performance is political because it is public, but it is also 
political (in an agitational sense) because cultural dialogue – 
prior to the gay rights movement – has worked to exclude these 
performances.  Conversely, a heterosexual identity and the 
concurrent assumption of the naturalness of heterosexuality 
suggest that the performance of that identity is only political 
when used in opposition to the performance of gay identities.  
For instance, in the current political debate over gay marriage, 
the naturalness of heterosexual marriage is performed in 
opposition to the somehow unnatural union of two men or two 
women.   
Butler seems to address the public nature of the 
performative act, writing that the performative act is 
citational; she writes of the judge who “cites the law that he 
applies” and notes that it is this citation which provides the 
power to the judge’s statement.  Accordingly, it is the citation 
which forms the subject, for “recognition is not conferred on a 
subject, but forms that subject” (Bodies 226).   
Herein resides my divergence from Butler’s argument.  
Butler’s reliance on citation or recognition denies the 
existence of a pre-determined subject, one who – from the 
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beginning – acts on the world around them.  Yet, in publicly 
performing the declarative, gay people work to re-code 
themselves either within or against the promoted monolithic gay 
identity. I argue that within the public sphere and through 
resignification, identity groups work to achieve their own 
political aims through citing themselves as subjects worthy of 
consideration by the larger mainstream public.  
Some critics have argued that the only basis for gay 
political agitation is the performance of their sexualized 
identities in the public sphere.  In their essay, “Sex in 
Public” Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner suggest that the goal 
of the queer6 political movement is and has always been to change 
attitudes about non-heteronormative sexualities.  They are thus 
placing political performances of gay identities squarely within 
the public sphere.  Berlant and Warner propose that 
[ . . . ] the heteronormativity of US culture is not 
something that can be easily rezoned or disavowed by 
individual acts of will [or] by a subversiveness imagined 
only as personal rather than as the basis of public-
formation [ . . . ] (367 emphasis added) 
As I suggested above, the mainstream culture’s heteronormativity 
is not challenged when a single individual identifies as gay or 
lesbian.  Subverting that heteronormativity might certainly be a 
personal goal, but Berlant and Warner see such subversion as the 
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basis of creating a public – that is to say a group of people 
who are working towards the achievement of public, political 
goals. 
In this argument, I am supported by Nancy Fraser’s 
reformulation of Habermas’s public sphere in light of “actually 
existing democracy” (“Rethinking” 518).  By allowing only 
certain groups of people access to public debate, the public 
sphere as conceived by Habermas serves as an instrument of 
control.  Because other groups are denied access to the “theatre 
[of] political participation” (the public sphere), those groups 
cannot achieve their political aims.  Fraser terms these other 
groups (like gays, feminists, African-Americans) subaltern 
counter-publics.  According to Fraser, the real goal of any 
subaltern counter-public, as part of the larger “indeterminate, 
empirically counterfactual body” (“Rethinking” 528) she calls 
the “public at large,” is to disseminate (and through that 
dissemination to work to control) the discourse about one’s own 
counter-public within the public sphere.   
In the current debate over allowing gays to participate in 
state-sanctioned marriage contracts, for instance, gay men and 
lesbians have worked to publicize the large number of benefits 
such marriage contracts grant to heterosexual couples:  rights 
of financial survivorship and tax advantages and health 
insurance assistance.  Less tangible non-economic rights include 
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the right of a surviving partner to care for a couple’s children 
when one partner dies and the right of a partner to visit his or 
her significant other in the hospital.  The success of Vermont’s 
civil union legislation is, I think, indicative of gays and 
lesbians wresting public control of the discourse about the 
issue in a struggle for what Fraser terms “participatory parity” 
(“Rethinking” 524) in the public sphere.  Access to the public 
debate becomes possible as the gay subaltern counter-public 
finds a “space of withdrawal and regroupment” and a “training 
ground for agitational activities directed toward wider publics” 
(“Rethinking” 528).  In other words, in gay communities, the 
debate emerges as one through which to publicize an image 
conducive to efficacious political gain.  For instance, while 
many gay men and lesbians are not coupled with significant 
others, the image that is put forward to advance the larger 
culture’s debate over gay marriage is that of long-term 
committed couples.  By creating a space in which these things 
can be debated internally before (or during) their presentation 
to the larger (mainstream) public, the gay political movement is 
able to gain participatory parity in the public sphere.  
This contemporary moment in the gay political movement, 
then, is tied to a conception of gay identities which parallel 
the theories of Fraser and Butler.  In Butler’s performative 
act, I see a first step in the formation of gay identities, both 
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individually and communally.  I mean to suggest that the 
announcement of one’s identity (or difference) begins the 
process by which he or she can begin to reinterpret the codes 
and norms that form the larger public’s understanding of that 
identity.  Communally, as larger numbers of people participate 
in the performative announcement of difference, Fraser’s 
subaltern counter-public is formed around that difference and 
serves as a space for debate amongst members of the group – 
debate that ultimately provides an advantage in the public 
sphere.  The process of redefining gay identities in the public 
sphere is, then, a political process – one with the ultimate 
goal of ensuring the equality of gay citizens.  Through this 
process, gay people have found the means to achieve the promise 
inherent in the translation of E Pluribus Unum that reads “One 
Unity Composed of Many Parts.”  I find in this translation the 
ultimate goal of all subaltern counter-publics: the goal of 
achieving full citizenship while maintaining different cultural 
identities. 
   
Three Sites of Gay Identity Performances 
An examination of Southern Decadence (an annual gay street 
party in the French Quarter), the public memory of Matthew 
Shepard (the victim of a hate crime whose murder spawned 
national media attention), and the United States Supreme Court 
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(as a “creator” of gay and lesbian identities through its 
written decisions) reveals:  
(1) the images that were (and are) put forward for 
mainstream viewers and the political messages which 
those images supported and  
(2) the inter-group debates over the meaning of those 
messages for the gay and lesbian community, itself.   
   The process of reinterpretation of gay identities is an 
historical process, and one that is fraught with inter-group 
contestation over the “proper images” to put forward in the 
public sphere.  With each of the three sites as focal points, I 
use articles written in both the mainstream press and in the 
popular gay press to explore the public imaging of gay people in 
the mainstream and the internal debates that such imaging 
causes.  I also examine culturally specific documents.  For 
instance, at Southern Decadence, I found a flyer revealing 
internal tensions over “proper” public images.  In the case of 
the public memory of Matthew Shepard, I examine The Laramie 
Project as one strategic utterance used by the gay community in 
the promotion of Matthew Shepard as a surrogate for victims of 
hate crimes.  In the final chapter, court documents and legal 
scholarship informs my argument about the attempt – within the 
public sphere of the court – to resignify gay identities. 
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Briefly, Southern Decadence is a party that began in the 
early 1970s in the French Quarter of New Orleans.  In its 
earliest days, it was characterized as shocking; more than that, 
though, the party clearly served as a space for the performance 
of gay male identities in a public space.  While not 
particularly activist, the very presence of these larger than 
life gay identities in the public space (at the beginning of a 
political movement) is metaphorically similar to the 
confrontational political stance of the gay community during 
this early phase. 
 The French Quarter during Southern Decadence most easily 
fits my conception of a “site.” Chapter one, “Taking it Public,” 
will explore how the party has changed and how the various 
performances of identities have changed – or not.  As a result 
of the broad exposure to both a larger gay community and to the 
mainstream, this event has prompted internal debate about 
whether or not appropriate images are being presented and 
performed at Decadence.    
 I also examine the French Quarter as a sex zone, a 
metropolitan area in which sexualized identities are more easily 
explored. The movement toward cities was a result, according to 
John D’Emilio, of the rise of capitalism (and the individual) 
over the family-based agrarian economic system of the mid- to 
late-nineteenth century. In short, D’Emilio argues that the 
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individual was able to separate him- or herself from the family.  
This separation created the condition in which a gay identity 
could flourish.  Cities served as a place to explore these 
identities away from the strictures of family life.  These 
spaces within the city served as safe spaces, if you will, for 
the expression of gayness (“Capitalism” 470-1). 
 The second site I examine is not a physical site.  Instead, 
it is most easily defined as the site of public memory.  Chapter 
two, “Standing in for . . .,” focuses on the death of Matthew 
Shepard and the creation of an effigy that served, in 
surrogation, as a symbol for gay men across the country.  
Moreover, Shepard – the symbol – has remained a site of 
contestation with various groups working to promote Shepard as a 
“stand in.”  I examine the historical shift that likely occurred 
around the time of Shepard’s death, a shift in focus from the 
kinds of gay visibility provided by street demonstrations to a 
more calculated creation of images for public consumption.  Some 
cultural critics have argued that this shift, which included the 
creation of an effigy, actually served to damage the political 
goal of the passage of hate crimes legislation.  I also examine 
the work by other subaltern counter-publics to reformulate 
Matthew Shepard’s image in effigy – an effigy which ensures 
Shepard stands in only for the “degenerate nature” of homosexual 
people. 
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In chapter three, “Criminal Queers,” I examine two of the 
sodomy-related court cases heard by the justices of the Supreme 
Court.  Through an examination of the legal strategies used by 
those arguing for the abolition of laws criminalizing sodomy 
(the only sexual option available to gay and lesbian people), I 
uncover a different kind of normalizing regime.  The written 
opinions of the Supreme Court are one normalizing force in our 
democracy.  For instance, the Supreme Court’s binding opinion in 
the well-known Roe v. Wade case decriminalized abortion – thus, 
it normalized (in this case, made non-criminal) doctors who 
performed the surgical procedure.  The pursuit of 
decriminalization, then, is the pursuit of normalization. 
I use Nancy Fraser’s work in this chapter to suggest the 
process by which subaltern counter-publics achieve notice of 
their politicized (i.e.: publicized) needs.  Once a need (or a 
political goal) of a counter-public is recognized, the counter-
public can begin to seek the fulfillment of that need (or 
reinterpretation of that need) in the halls of government – the 
arbiter of the public sphere.  This seeking of recognition is 
also a seeking of normalization on a cultural scale. I look at 
the various legal strategies used in the two sodomy law cases to 
come before the Supreme Court of the United States – Bowers v. 
Hardwick in 1986 and Lawrence and Garner v. Texas in 2003.  The 
two cases had decidedly different outcomes, and the cases hinged 
27 
upon the very construction (or not) of a sexualized identity.  I 
theorize as to the possible gains and losses of this move 
towards normalization. 
At various points in this study, I refer to a gay identity 
as a sexualized identity.  The gay male identity is invariably 
tied, I think, to the earliest constructions of the homosexual 
male as a man who has sex with other males, which is part of the 
abnormalization of the homosexual.  To address the cultural 
proscription against homosexuality, then, the initial phase of 
the gay rights movement was simply about saying that gay men 
exist and that gay men’s sexual choices are normal.  The 
promotion of an identity based on sexual acts was relatively 
common.  A person’s identity seemingly revolved around who that 
person chose as a sexual partner.  However, over the past thirty 
years of resignification of gay identities, multiple codes have 
attached to the word “gay.”  In other words, choosing to self-
identify as a gay male has become more than publicly indicating 
one’s sexual object choice; being gay is about being “who I am” 
versus about being “what I do” sexually. 
 I have chosen these three sites for exploration because 
they each seem to be tied to political goals.  At the beginning 
of Southern Decadence, for instance, the goal seemed to be 
simple visibility.  The national gay and lesbian political 
movement had, by the time of Matthew Shepard’s death, identified 
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the passage of legislation that provided for stiffer sentencing 
for hate crimes as a political goal.  Finally, at least since 
1986, the decriminalization of sodomy (and thus the 
resignification of gay and lesbian people as non-criminal) has 
been the goal of at least one national gay and lesbian legal/ 
political organization. 
In the context of this contemporary history, cultural 
documents (i.e., newspapers, magazines, websites, plays, court 
documents) are indicative of the debates that go on within the 
public sphere around the sites I define.  A site is, according 
to Joseph Roach, a behavioral vortex, which he explains is  
[ . . . ] a center of cultural self-invention through the 
restoration of behavior [ . . . ] a zone or district for 
transgression, for things that couldn’t happen otherwise or 
elsewhere. (28) 
Roach’s definition of a behavioral vortex is tied, I think, to 
the notion of a space for a subaltern counter public.  For 
instance, one vortex he identifies is Congo Square in New 
Orleans, a site where the everyday practice of slaves and free 
African people was “legitimated, ‘brought out into the open,’ 
reinforced, celebrated, or intensified” (28).  We can see the 
sites of cultural performances of all subaltern counter-publics 
(including the gay subaltern counter-public) as behavioral 
vortices. 
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Most of Roach’s behavioral vortices are located in physical 
places.  My expansion of the concept includes other spaces where 
all sorts of cultural performances happen. Roach argues, 
“Vortices of behavior tend to occupy liminal ground” (64). Thus, 
the ground, the site, and what happens in it become open to 
interpretation either by official discourse or by the subaltern 
counter-public that performs in the liminal space.  For 
instance, the drag queen is simultaneously a shocking and 
abnormal image to mainstream audiences and a fun and campy image 
to those within the community.  The debates over image are 
really debates over the proper interpretation of events that 
happen within behavioral vortices.   
In each of these sites, I have also located a specific 
political goal around which the debates seem to coalesce.  The 
goals seem to follow a trajectory of the gay and lesbian 
political movement – one which begins with the political goal of 
simple visibility (Southern Decadence) continuing through the 
other political goals I have identified.  This trajectory is 
somewhat chronological, though uneasily so. For instance, 
Southern Decadence began two years following the “birth” of the 
gay and lesbian civil rights movement (commonly assumed to be 
the riots at New York’s Stonewall Inn in 1969) but it continues 
to this day.  The nature of Southern Decadence has changed as 
the political landscape has changed.  Likewise, the public 
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memory of Matthew Shepard (October 1997) continues to be a hotly 
debated topic, both within and without the gay community.7  In 
the final example, while the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court 
to overturn a Texas sodomy law was issued in 2003, the gay and 
lesbian community has pursued decriminalization of sodomy at 
least since 1986. 
As we see, locating these sites along a chronological 
history is difficult at best.  Still, we can see a shift within 
the political movement from an overtly activist phase to a more 
assimilationist approach as the history of the gay rights 
movement progresses.  In truth, even locating the beginning of a 
gay and lesbian civil rights movement is difficult.  Although 
commonly thought to begin with Stonewall, the political movement 
named “the gay rights movement” actually has roots in 
organization of homosexual men and women as early as the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  John D’Emilio, in an 
afterword to the 1998 printing of his groundbreaking study, 
Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual 
Minority in the United States, 1940-1970, notes that one of his 
major points of emphasis in writing the text was that “gay and 
lesbian life [as commonly assumed] didn’t start with Stonewall” 
(250).  Rather, there was already a rich and varied culture in 
place that may have contributed to the riot at the Stonewall 
Inn,8 but did not begin there. 
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Gay Identities in the Public Sphere 
 Exploring three different sites at which public imaging of 
gay people and identities occurs uncovers a kind of chronology 
of the gay rights movement from an initial goal of simple 
visibility through the later political goals of the passage of 
hate crimes legislation and decriminalization of sodomy.  As the 
tactics of the movement shifted, certain public images of gay 
people were put forth in service of these tactics.  These 
normalizing images created internal debates about the erasures 
of certain types of people they caused as well as about the 
political goal they advanced.  In the end, the gay rights 
movement has, I argue, been about working towards full 
citizenship for gay people in terms of achieving certain 
political rights granted to heterosexuals.   
 Obviously, this work is situated squarely alongside other 
postmodern theoretical approaches to understanding culture and 
politics.  I am unaware of other studies which have focused on 
the specific strategies for the presentation of gay public 
images and the kinds of inter-group contestation that those 
images cause.  In each chapter, I have used the intellectual 
models provided by these postmodern thinkers to elucidate the 
gay political movement.  My attempt is to bridge the 
theory/practice divide between liberally identified thinkers 
such as Sedgwick, Butler, and Fraser and gay and lesbian 
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political activists.  Furthermore, in the examination of the 
specific strategies as a sort of road map for political 
activity, I hope that multiple publics can use this study as a 
tool for the achievement of their political goals.  In the final 
analysis, however, I think this study ultimately argues for the 
multiple nature of gay identities – identities not so easily 




1 The Log Cabin Republicans are self-identified gay people in the 
Republican Party. 
 
2 I borrow the phrase “actually existing democracy” from Nancy 
Fraser (“Rethinking” 528). 
 
3 In the cultural imaginary, the AIDS “crisis” is construed to 
have ended with the development of AIDS drugs which changed the 
disease from one which resulted in death to one which could be 
managed through the continued, regular use of pharmaceutical 
interventions.  
 
4 The phrase was first required on U.S. Coins by the Coinage Act 
of 1873, but had been used on coins since 1795 — a mere 19 years 
following the signing of the Declaration of Independence.  Even 
following the passage of the law, the phrase did not appear on 
all coins.  Apparently, the mint did not initially read the 1873 
law as mandatory.  John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas 
Jefferson initially proposed the phrase as a motto for the 
United States on August 10, 1776 (http://www.atheists.org) and 
it became part of the seal of the United States in 1782. 
 
5 While the public sphere as characterized by Habermas has its 
merits, I do not mean to call on his concept in total, as will 
become clear. 
 
6 Berlant and Warner are recognized as two of the first in the 




use critical theory in an engagement with queer identities.  The 
use of the word “queer” is meant, I think, to suggest multiple 
identities which do not fall within heteronormative relationship 
categories. 
 
7 In a 20/20 episode, Elizabeth Vargas argued Shepard’s murder 
was not a hate crime (Graham par. 8). 
 
8 The Stonewall Inn is the name of a bar in New York where a 
group of gays and lesbians fought against police who raided the 





TAKING IT PUBLIC: 
PERFORMING GAY IDENTITIES IN NEW ORLEANS 
 
In order to achieve political gain, the first step for an 
identity group must be the publicization and politicization of 
their needs.  In the case of the gay community, that 
politicization required another sort of step – coming out – 
making public their identities as people who desired others of 
the same sex.  During the earliest phase of the rights movement, 
the mass publicization of these identities was, I think we can 
safely assume, a shock to the mainstream culture. 
Southern Decadence represents a kind of coming out for the 
gay male community in South Louisiana. Lesbians, by and large, 
do not participate in Southern Decadence. During my most recent 
participation, I only witnessed six to ten women there without 
groups of gay men.  Although lesbian bars present events which 
might draw a crowd that weekend, many participants with whom I 
conversed indicated that lesbians shied away from the event. For 
instance, an ad for Rubyfruit Jungle, a now-defunct lesbian bar 
in the Quarter but outside of the gay section, indicates bar 
owners gave away a Cannondale bike through a raffle on the 
Sunday night before Labor Day in 1997.  Southern Decadence is 
predominantly a gay male phenomenon. 
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Occurring every Labor Day weekend, the Southern Decadence 
parade, reveals a kind of coming out, a kind of publicization of 
a gay identity.  Roberts Batson, known colloquially as New 
Orleans’ gay historian (both because he is a historian who is 
gay and because his project is uncovering the history of gay 
people’s participation in the life of the French Quarter), 
identifies the beginning of Southern Decadence as the year 1972 
(very early in the gay rights movement, commonly assumed to have 
begun just two years earlier.1)  In New Orleans as in other urban 
areas, however, gays had lived in the French Quarter prior to 
the Stonewall riots; the website, gaymardigras.com, indicates 
that the first gay Mardi Gras krewe began in 1958 (“Brief 
History,” par. 25).  Still, Southern Decadence, in its earliest 
phases, served as a public presentation of contemporary gay 
identities.  
In the thirty-two years since, Southern Decadence has grown 
into an annual party similar to gay pride parades in other parts 
of the country.  In this chapter, I examine the phenomenon of 
Southern Decadence with a particular eye towards the public 
images of gay men presented during the weekend-long festivities.  
These public images serve as spaces for dialogue between the 
mainstream (heterosexual) community and the gay community.  I 
also examine the inter-group tensions that are caused by the 
public images presented.  In the final analysis, I want to 
 36
suggest that Southern Decadence, although it has been 
interpreted as an insular phenomenon, has a political impact on 
a broader scale and provides an inclusive space for a broad 
range of gay identities. 
The 1972 party was, most decidedly, not intended to serve a 
political purpose.  Initially a private party, it was invitation 
only and meant for friends of Michael Evers, a young man who was 
soon leaving town to return to his home in Michigan. Party-goers 
were encouraged to dress as their favorite Southern Decadent – á 
la Tennessee Williams, Carson McCullers, or Truman Capote, and 
perhaps one or two Southern belles (Figure 1A).  A group of 
friends who lived together in a house in the Treme district (at 
2110 Barracks St.) threw the party, and the unofficial 
inauguration of the parade occurred when all at the party left 
the house and paraded through the streets to Café Lafitte’s, 
then known as Matassa’s.  The revelers had such a good time at 
the party that they had another two weeks later and again the 
next year.  This time, they began the party at the bar and 
marched back to the house, aptly named Belle Reve, after the 
plantation Stella and Blanche lost in A Streetcar Named Desire.  
In 1973, the first Grand Marshal was selected, and that position 
remains to this day the only formal kind of organization the 
event can boast.  Now, the phenomenon of Southern Decadence 
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spans the entire Labor Day weekend and is attended by large 
numbers of gay men from all over the country. 
As this brief history suggests, Batson does not uncover any 
specific desire on the part of the initial revelers to advance a 
political statement.  That no such desire is revealed in the 
history raises one of the central questions of this chapter: Is 
Southern Decadence truly a political gesture?  Even from the 
beginning, stepping into the streets as these revelers did was 
indeed a political act.  John D’Emilio reports the perception 
promoted by early gay activists that “A vast silence surrounded 
the topic of homosexuality, perpetuating both invisibility and 
isolation” (Sexual Politics 1).  Coming out – stepping into the 
streets as a gay person – was and remains a political act 
because of this invisibility across the cultural spectrum in 
media and public discourse. In this vein, Southern Decadence can 
be regarded as a microcosm of the gay political movement.  That 
movement began, first, with the political statement of 
“existence.”  Today, the movement is a larger, more inclusive 
movement that further demands the recognition of the rights of 
gay citizens.  Today, Southern Decadence likewise serves as a 
site for the performance of multiple gay identities and is one 
reason the New Orleans gay community is recognized for its 
contribution, at least economically, to the city. 
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Some want to label Southern Decadence as specifically 
apolitical and not tied to a gay rights agenda.  Some gay 
political leaders argue that the party is only that – and should 
not be interpreted as representative of gay political struggles.  
However, a reading of gay history similar to that of John 
D’Emilio’s, in his essay “Capitalism and Gay Identity,” suggests 
that these early public gatherings helped to create a public 
environment that made it easier for more gay people to come out.2  
Nancy Fraser talks of the importance for subaltern counter-
publics polticizing their “needs.”  Fraser references welfare 
clients (Unruly 177-9), but politicizing one’s “needs” can be 
broadly interpreted to include the movement towards what I have 
called full citizenship.  The movement towards full citizenship 
is the political achievement of civil rights for gays.  The 
first step of this trajectory towards full citizenship is the 
act of coming out, which forces the larger public to recognize 
the other within its midst.  Metaphorically, Southern Decadence 
is that first step. 
The two readings of Southern Decadence – 1) as a political 
gesture and 2) as only a party – seem to have some basis in the 
history of the event.  Even if there were no political 
aspirations on the part of the first revelers, the party no 
doubt served the initial purpose of politicizing the existence 
of a gay community.  That such a community was not commonly 
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thought to exist can be read by the earliest media references to 
the phenomenon from the mid-1980s in which one can read a kind 
of mainstream panic over the gay men parading through their 
streets.   
This tension – over whether or not the phenomenon itself is 
representative of the gay community – indicates the in-group 
tension about which identities were the proper ones for 
presentation to the mainstream (in the public sphere).  By the 
late 1990s, media coverage of the event occurred with some 
regularity, and the broad popularization of the event engendered 
a kind of crisis of public image.  The mainstream, forced to 
recognize the other within its midst, has responded 
alternatively with loathing or acceptance. The argument of at 
least one Southern Decadence participant is that the images are 
unacceptable presentations to a mainstream community looking for 
an excuse to deny gay people full citizenship.  An opposing 
argument is that the images presented at Southern Decadence are 
acceptable because they form a part of the gay community, 
however desirous some might be to erase them from public view. 
In the rest of the chapter, I intend to explore the in-
group tensions surrounding proper public images as well as the 
dialogue the gay community has with the mainstream community as 
a result of these images.  Before doing so, however, I want to 
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locate the phenomenon of Southern Decadence within the kind of 
behavioral vortex I discussed in the prologue. 
 
The Road to Visibility: The Safe Space of the French Quarter 
In the early history of the gay rights movement, cities 
provided safe spaces (such as the French Quarter) for public 
performances of identity.  These gay enclaves, or sex zones, 
were moderately protective environments in which to initiate 
public display.  The development of gay enclaves is well 
documented, and these enclaves were the sites of the earliest 
public exploration of the identities gay men.  In Gay New York, 
George Chauncey locates gay people and communities in New York 
as early as the 1920s (1-29).  Gay enclaves developed within the 
cities, creating behavioral vortices.  These behavioral vortices 
might also be labeled “safe spaces” for the gay rights movement.  
Even though the notion of safe space must be interrogated, 
almost at every turn, I want to note that subaltern communities 
create safe spaces in order to support their functionality as a 
group by allowing a group a relatively protected staging area 
for public display. 
I take the notion of safe space from Farah Jasmine 
Griffin’s “Who Set You Flowin’?: The African-American Migration 
Narrative.” In Griffin’s understanding, safe spaces are 
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At their most progressive [ . . . ] spaces of retreat, 
healing and resistance; at their most reactionary [ . . . ] 
potentially provincial spaces which do not encourage 
resistance but instead help create complacent subjects 
whose only aim is to exist within the confines of the power 
that oppresses them. (9) 
Griffin is of course correct to question the value of safe 
space.  Safe spaces can be both progressive spaces of healing 
and resistance which allow subaltern counter-publics staging 
areas for public display and places in which individuals of 
those counter-publics may find others like them.  On the other 
hand, provincial spaces (like tenement houses or ghettoes) are 
created to keep subaltern groups within their particular place 
in a power structure. For the gay community, such spaces –gay 
bars, gay pride parades, public parks, parties like Southern 
Decadence, and communities of gays like Castro Street in San 
Francisco, Boystown in Chicago, Chelsea in New York, and the 
French Quarter in New Orleans – can indeed be both progressive 
(healing) and provincial (oppressive).  
Provincial, oppressive spaces are created when the space 
becomes a place which is marked as the site of the Other.  
Ghettoization is that marking off, in geographic, spatial and 
also cultural terms within a city, of an area defined as a 
ghetto.  In the recent cultural imagination of America, the word 
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has been used also to refer to mass public housing projects in 
which African-Americans lived.  In common parlance, one often 
hears reference to the Castro district in San Francisco, for 
instance, as a gay ghetto.  The gay ghetto becomes marked as the 
site of the Other and a gay man becomes ghettoized as he moves 
to live within that space; he marks himself as gay and lives a 
life fully within that ghetto, limiting his interaction with 
mainstream heterosexist culture. 
The French Quarter is a safe space, although it too might 
be interpreted as a ghettoized, provincial space.  Certainly, by 
the beginning of the Southern Decadence phenomenon the French 
Quarter in New Orleans had come to serve as a sex zone, to use 
Pat Califia’s label.  Not unlike Roach’s behaviorial vortices, 
sex zones serve as staging areas for the public performances of 
sexualized identities.  In Public Sex: The Culture of Radical 
Sex, she groups red-light districts (the zone of sex workers), 
combat zones (the zones in which mainstream culture intersects 
with sexualized culture), and gay ghettoes together under the 
rubric – sex zone.  Califia argues, “The city is a map of the 
hierarchy of desire, from the valorized to the stigmatized. It 
is divided into zones dictated by the way its citizens value or 
denigrate their needs” (216).  Compare, for instance, the 
valorized business district to the stigmatized red-light 
district or even to the gay ghetto. 
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Calling gay enclaves sex zones may be problematic, but 
Califia’s main goal is to encourage more open attitudes towards 
all sexual minorities (in which categorization she includes gay, 
sex workers, and sadomasochists), even within the gay male 
community itself.  She argues that “gay ghettos operate 
differently from other types of sex zones” primarily because 
they also provide living space for gay men, noting further, “Gay 
men comprise the only sexual minority to have established its 
own enclave [their] the modern city” (219).   
Califia’s sex zones serve as safe spaces for the 
expression, contestation, formulation, performance, and 
reformulation of multiple identities.  Califia argues that sex 
zones come to serve as these kinds of sites because of the 
visibility these sites provide: 
[ . . . ] without the support of a well-organized, powerful 
(or at least visible) subculture, most sexual deviants are 
unwilling to identify openly with their sexual preference 
[ . . . ] Isolation begets invisibility, which perpetuates 
isolation [. . .]. (224)   
Califia’s essay reads almost like an invitation for other sexual 
minorities to join with gay people in the enclave of the gay 
ghetto. Still, her argument points to the liminality of sex 
zones, generally, and more specifically, the behavioral vortex 
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that is the sex zone of the French Quarter and its role as a 
staging area, a site of public visibility for gay people. 
Not unlike the gay ghettoes of Castro Street in San 
Francisco or Boystown in Chicago, the French Quarter in New 
Orleans has a long history of functioning as the kind of sex 
zone discussed in Pat Califia’s essay.  Wesley Shrum marks the 
French Quarter as a behavioral vortex for the performance of 
sexualized identities. Shrum’s sociological study of the 
tradition of bead exchange at Mardi Gras also highlights the 
French Quarter as the home of gay people and its status as a sex 
zone (even prior to the Stonewall Riots).  He writes, “The area 
was traditionally associated with expressions of overt 
sexuality” (428).  He mentions the history of Storyville and 
marks the 1950s as the period when “burlesque clubs [ . . . ] 
proliferated.”  According to Shrum,  
In the 1960s, the quarter began to develop a second 
identity, serving as residence and cultural center for a 
large number of Southern gays in an atmosphere of 
permissiveness and relative acceptance. Public nudity was 
not uncommon in the commercialized context of bars and 
other businesses catering to the gay community. (429) 
The French Quarter today remains a home for gay people.  
Although now less common, public nudity can still be seen in the 
French Quarter; gays still claim it as a residence; there 
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continues to be an atmosphere of relative acceptance; there are 
still bars and other businesses catering to the gay community.  
Quite obviously, the licentious atmosphere of the French Quarter 
prompted the initial party’s participants to “parade” down its 
streets.  Historically, then, the French Quarter can be related 
to other safe spaces for gay people in other metropolitan areas.  
These safe spaces – these sex zones – served as relatively 
permissive environments in which gay men could begin to perform 
their identities and to function as public citizens of a 
community.  These spaces served as staging areas for the public 
imaging that started gay people on the road to visibility 
Safe spaces such as the Quarter provided increased 
opportunities for gays to perform their identities in the public 
sphere.  The performances were limited to the available range of 
images of gay people.  From the earliest days of the gay rights 
movement, the most shocking images – the drag queen and the 
leatherman – were the only available images of the gay community 
for viewing by the mainstream.  Just like media coverage of 
pride parades in other cities, the first article in the 
mainstream press (in the New Orleans Times-Picayune) about 
Southern Decadence focused almost exclusively on the image of 
the drag queen.  That focus, in this article and on a broader 
scale, ensured that the drag queen formed one “signification” or 
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definition of the gay male which would have then attached to 
anyone who publicly self-identified as gay. 
In the article which appeared in the paper on Labor Day, 
1988, writer Christopher Rose labels Southern Decadence “the 
largest drag queen parade in the South” (B1).  In a short piece 
introducing the article at the beginning of the paper, the 
editorial staff writes: “[Southern Decadence] celebrates the end 
of summer” (A2). They quote the article, which points out that 
the male participants in the parade had spent “most of the 
morning and early afternoon primping and drinking in bars” (A2).  
The image of the drag queen was publicly presented at the 
parade (one part of Southern Decadence) and viewed by the 
writer, who I argue is representative of the mainstream if only 
because he writes for a mainstream paper.  As we will see, this 
initial image was read as “shocking,” even though parade 
participants may not have been intending to shock.  Because of 
this limited spectrum of public images for gay people, the shock 
factor continued to be a source of concern within the gay 
community about the kinds of images presented to the mainstream. 
For instance, the mainstream culture was unlikely to be ready to 
accept the thought of men (in 1988) “primping” to be ready for 
the afternoon parade. 
Despite Rose’s characterization, Southern Decadence was not 
simply a drag queen parade. Drag attire was, however, the 
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costume choice of many parade participants. Because the image of 
the drag queen was the predominant image presented at the 
parade, the presentation of that image in the public sphere 
effected the abnormalization of all gay males.  As an outsider, 
with only his eyes to see, Rose interpreted the available images 
for his readers.  That outsider’s perspective collapsed 
distinctions recognized within the gay community.  Rose’s 
description of Southern Decadence, the happening, bears some 
recitation here:  
Southern Decadence began twenty years ago as an end of 
summer party among Quarter neighbors and friends, both 
straight and gay. Over the years, the party outgrew the 
indoors and fell out of favor with straight people.  It 
then moved into the streets, evolving into a wandering 
shock parade. (B2) 
In actuality, the party “outgrew the indoors” at its very 
beginning and the “shock parade” was simply young men and women 
in costume walking through the French Quarter. Moreover, we can 
identify the party’s beginning as 1972 – 17 years before the 
article’s appearance. I do not read an intent “to shock” from 
the descriptions I have gathered about the original party 
participants.  As well, the nature of the French Quarter in the 
early 1970s (as defined by Wesley Shrum) may very will have 
limited any shock potential – especially since the party, in its 
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early days, was relatively insular.  Still, one must point out 
that seeing gay men in this fashion at all could very well have 
been shocking (Rose interviewed “two stunned visitors from 
Chicago” [B2]). 
Viewing this particular parade would not have shocked a gay 
man or a lesbian.  Moreover, it is unlikely that a gay man would 
have assumed this was the only possible gay male identity 
available to him.  Within the gay community there are various 
types of drag performance, and even in the late 1980s, drag 
performance was mostly confined to bars.   
Much of the drag costuming in the parade falls within a 
phenomenon called “camp drag.” Camp drag – unlike much of the 
drag that could be seen in gay bars in the late 1980s and unlike 
that drag reported by Esther Newton in Mother Camp – is a truly 
exaggerated expression of female hair, make-up and clothing.  
Camp drag is drag of the type seen in the film, Priscilla, Queen 
of the Desert: over the top drag with huge wigs, wild make-up, 
and brightly colored clothing.  Camp drag calls attention to the 
constructed nature of gender because, oftentimes, men in camp 
drag will remain unshaven.  Contrastingly, in what might be 
called “true drag,” the drag queen attempts to fully put on the 
costume of woman, shaving face, chest, legs and arms. 
 49
  
Rose cannot be faulted for much of this collapse of 
identities.  The image of the drag queen was one of the few 
publicly performed gay identities.  Still, the collapse of 
relatively distinct identities is dangerous and is the cause of 
a kind of anxiety experienced by gay men as they view the 
available public imaging of their own identities. 
In some way, gay men who make the choice of performing 
their sexual identities publicly understand Judith Bulter's 
definition of the performative.  When one announces, publicly, 
the declarative statement, “I am gay,” significations attach to 
that person.  In this particular case, we see that the 
signification that attaches to gay males is that of drag queen 
or cross-dresser.  As there are no other public images 
available, this signification is coerced, in that a gay man is 
automatically coded as a drag queen. The identity of drag queen, 
perhaps only put on for the afternoon parade, becomes by the 
very public nature of this newspaper article, the identity of 
all parade participants, and, perhaps, of all gay men, 
Figure 1B: Camp drag at Southern Decadence 
(from the author’s personal collection). 
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generally.  The political project then is, perhaps, to expand 
the range of available public images that attach to those gay 
men who publicly self-identify as gay. 
 
Dialogue with the Mainstream: From Shock to Conciliation 
By 1996, the gay political movement had moved away from its 
earlier type of political activism, when many gay public images 
were intended to shock the mainstream into recognition of the 
existence of gay people.  Sometime following the end of the AIDS 
crisis (with the development of anti-AIDS drugs), the gay 
political movement adopted a different strategy – conciliation 
and assimilation.  The move was towards beginning a dialogue 
between the mainstream and the gay community to find common 
political ground. 
This shift was heralded by several political successes. In 
the United States, as a whole, there was a broader movement 
towards recognition of the gay male other within its midst.  
According to the editor of The Advocate, 1997 saw Ellen 
DeGeneres publicly self-identify as a lesbian (Weider, par. 2), 
President Clinton publicly urge “gay men and lesbians to come 
out” (Weider, par. 3), and “sex responsibilities” became the 
subject of national media coverage (Weider, par. 1).  In New 
Orleans in 1997, then Mayor Marc Morial signed an executive 
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order extending benefits to the domestic partners of gay and 
lesbian city employees (“New Orleans,” par. 1). 
Gay scholars and writers have also marked this shift. 
Edmund White, a self-identified gay author, discussed this shift 
in a recent interview on the National Public Radio program, 
Fresh Air (10 Nov. 2004).  White suggested that this shift was a 
result of the incorporation of non-leftist gay people into the 
gay rights movement following the AIDS crisis.  According to 
White, leftists “were the only people who were really willing to 
come out.”  He continues, “the whole movement got taken over by 
the right and dragged towards assimilation.”  By and large, the 
end of the crisis is tied to the development of AIDS drugs that 
changed the cultural perception of the disease from a death 
sentence to a manageable disease akin to diabetes. 
A 1996 writer of a letter to the editor of the Times-
Picayune seemed to herald this shift of the gay political aims 
relative to Southern Decadence. Specifically, the letter calls 
upon the media and the government to recognize the event’s 
contribution to the tourist economy of the city, noting that: 
[ . . . ] It is odd that the local media don’t respond to 
the increased tourists and their money being spent in the 
city.  While actual attendance numbers are not available, 
the impact on the city’s coffers and local merchants’ 
income could and should be calculated. [ . . . ] Why was 
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this overlooked once again? Is it because it is a gay-
inspired holiday? Is it because it is not condoned by the 
city?  Where else in this city is there a parade with 
thousands of participants and onlookers where no portable 
toilets can be found?  Where else in this city is there a 
noticeable lack of police and police barricades to protect 
marchers and re-route traffic for a parade? (Carter B6) 
An assumption about the writer’s sexual identity (is he gay?) 
might be dangerous; however, his call for attention is different 
from previous entries into the public sphere.  The writer here 
suggests that Southern Decadence, despite its status as a “gay-
inspired holiday not condoned by the city,” should be recognized 
and supported by city officials and the media – if only for its 
contributions to the “city’s coffers.”  In short, the writer 
contends that despite its status as a gay event it deserves the 
same kinds of attention from the city as any other event that 
draws large numbers of people. 
The letter is indicative of the desire, at least on the 
part of the letter writer, for the phenomenon to be recognized 
for its benefits to the city’s tourism industry.  However, prior 
to this letter’s appearance, Decadence as a phenomenon had 
remained relatively insular.  No central organizing committee 
existed to monitor Decadence or tp work with city officials to 
ensure appropriate police coverage. Events related to Southern 
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Decadence are planned at multiple locations by various 
presenters throughout the Labor Day weekend (at bars and clubs, 
in the street, and in people’s homes). Even through Decadence in 
2001, the Grand Marshal had several official events but no 
responsibility to serve as an organizer or political 
representative.  The parade route, determined by the Grand 
Marshal, was not announced prior to the parade itself. 
In 1997, the Louisiana Lesbian and Gay Political Action 
Committee worked to improve the recognition of the event as part 
of the local economy.  They researched the economic impact of 
the event.  By 2001, police were invited to participate as 
partners in planning the event according to an article in 
“Downtown Picayune,” a special delivery section of The Times-
Picayune (LeGardeur 1).  A full-length, feature article appeared 
in the Times-Picayune in 1997, and broadcast media also covered 
the parade.  Clearly, these moves to perform different 
identities in the public sphere were not, necessarily, the 
result of this singular letter to the editor, but were rather 
indicative of the larger shift towards dialogue with the 
mainstream about gay events. 
The full-length Times-Picayune article (sans pictures) 
appeared in the Metro section of the newspaper – a rather 
prominent section, given that the entire paper is sometimes only 
four sections, including classified advertising.3  The article’s 
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author (one of the paper’s business writers) references the 
activities various bars were planning including a lesbian bar’s 
raffle for a mountain bike, the annual High Hair contest, and a 
theme night – “One Night in Heaven” – at one of the major gay 
dance clubs in the French Quarter (Yerton 1).   
The article includes a nod to the economic impact of the 
event, quoting the only estimates available – 50,000 tourists 
and a $25 million economic impact; the source was an 
unscientific survey done by the Lesbian and Gay Political Action 
Committee, which uses the acronym LAGPAC (Yerton 2).  LAGPAC’s 
survey, obviously, found that each participant spent $500 during 
the weekend.  Although unscientific if one does not include 
either hotel or air travel expense, it is not difficult to spend 
$500 in the French Quarter during this weekend.4  
This article reveals, I think, one way in which gay people 
began to demand notice from the power structure – through an 
appeal to the principles of a capitalist economy (“We make and 
spend money just like you”).  One of the downsides to such an 
approach, of course, is that it plays into a perception, within 
the mainstream, that all gay people form part of the economic 
middle class and/or the cultural elite, and have more disposable 
income.  The article points up one of the major erasures of some 
gay people by the phenomenon of Southern Decadence.  This party, 
clearly, by 1996, was not a party for all gay people in the 
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United States.  Lower income gays would not, of course, have 
been able to attend.  Does a middle class (and predominantly 
white) performance of gay identities constrain the identities of 
others, threatening, if you will, a white-washing, a blending of 
the multiple gay identities available?  Certainly, in this 
particular case, we must argue that the available performances – 
the available identities – at this particular event are 
constrained to, at the least, a middle-class gay male identity.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the phenomenon was, in 1997, 
recognized as an integral part of the city’s tourism industry. 
This recognition comes with at least one danger for the gay 
political movement – the danger that the mainstream culture 
will, because of its relative acceptance of the other within its 
midst, congratulate itself on that liberality while 
simultaneousely dismissing the political aims of the movement. 
If we can accept, for the moment, that erasures of individuals 
in society are dangerous, then we might begin to question the 
relative safety of Southern Decadence as a space in which the 
promotion of a specifically gay identity and political strategy 
occurs.   
Within a metropolis, a majority of people may possess a 
level of tolerance which allows gay people to live and work 
within their midst, even as openly gay people. This tolerance 
should not, however, be equated to blanket endorsement of gay 
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political issues.  I mean to suggest that because Southern 
Decadence is a party – defined by geographical boundaries which 
do not expand to the rest of the city – that non-gay people can 
look upon it in a self-congratulatory manner.  My logic follows 
that of Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, who argue that 
carnival, over a three-hundred year period, was reconstructed as 
“the culture of the Other” (387). The middle class, in emergence 
during part of this period from the seventeenth to the early 
twentieth century, came to disavow carnival as an important part 
of their everyday life.  At the end of this disavowal, carnival 
was dispersed – into literature, into other facets of everyday 
life.  Stallybrass and White write, “Carnival was too disgusting 
for bourgeois life to endure except as a sentimental spectacle” 
(388).   
Metaphorically, Southern Decadence might also be a party 
which allows the heterosexist mainstream to see the event as 
“sentimental spectacle,” dismissing the real political needs of 
gay people.  The tolerance for Southern Decadence mirrors 
“sentimental spectacle.”  Heterosexist individuals can look, 
approvingly, at themselves when Southern Decadence is in town 
and say, “Look how accepting we are of this other.”  This kind 
of tolerance – this kind of view of Southern Decadence – does 
not allow for the event’s political potential, nor for a true 
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kind of acceptance of the people who visit the French Quarter 
during the party.  
A letter to the editor printed in the Times-Picayune later 
in 1997 illustrates my point about the relative acceptance/non-
acceptance of gay men’s participation in Southern Decadence on 
by mainstream, heterosexual culture. The letter comes from a 
woman in Metairie.  Metairie is generally seen as a more 
conservative suburb of New Orleans, located near the airport, 
but still south and east of Lake Ponchartrain.  The writer 
suggests that events like Southern Decadence and Halloween in 
New Orleans (which in error she calls “Circus Eroticus,” which 
was the theme of only one year’s Halloween in New Orleans 
celebration) should not be promoted by either the city or 
tourism officials. The very names of the events, she writes, 
“indicate their immoral nature;” she continues, “[ . . . ]when 
good people allow immoral behavior to be promoted and say 
nothing, they bear a part of the guilt” (Guidry B6).  The 
vitriolic nature of the writer’s letter is suggestive of the 
larger geo- and socio-political climate in which gay people in 
New Orleans find themselves, questioning the relative “safety” 
of these sites.   
While the site of Southern Decadence and the Quarter can be 
seen as safe spaces, they sit within a largely morally 
conservative area. Areas of New Orleans like the Marigny, the 
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French Quarter, and the Bywater are often seen as highly liberal 
and generally infused with the laissez-fare attitude, “live and 
let live.” According to an online encyclopedia of Cajun culture, 
the Cajun saying Laissez les bon temps rouler (translated, “Let 
the Good Times Roll”) is indicative of the “[joy of living 
attitude] that pervades South Louisiana” (“Laissez les,” par. 
1). Given this principle, such a vitriolic attack from a New 
Orleans suburb might seem off kilter. 
This letter to the editor reveals the danger inherent in 
the public performance of gay identities. By this I mean to say, 
that because gay identities are sexualized identities, their 
public performance is subject to this kind of conservative 
attack.  Sexualized identities are always already immoral 
identities in a conservative system of logic.  Any public 
performance is thus branded immoral.  The assumption made, 
although not explicit, by the participant in the instant 
messaging conversation later in this chapter, would have gay 
people hide the most “outrageous” aspects of our collective 
identities in order to avoid this kind of criticism. 
In an odd statement, the chair of the Lesbian and Gay 
Political Action Committee, Christopher Daigle, takes great 
pains to similarly suggest that Southern Decadence (as the 
phenomenon existed in 1997) is not representative of the gay 
community.  The identities performed at Southern Decadence are 
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still too extreme for acceptance of the phenomenon under the 
larger rubric of the gay political movement.  He opines, “It’s 
camp.  The spirit of it is spontaneity;” and he moves to 
distance the event from “serious political and public health 
issues facing the gay community” (emphasis added).  This 1997 
statement from a leader of the gay rights movement in Louisiana 
heralds the general move away from confrontation and towards a 
conciliatory style of politics – or acclimation, as Edmund White 
calls it (Fresh Air 10 Nov. 2004).  Southern Decadence is a 
public performance of gay identities that broaches a dialogue 
between the subaltern counter-public – gay men – and the 
mainstream public at-large.  However, inter-group policing of 
identities has resulted from the move towards a more 
conciliatory style of political action.   
 
Public Sexuality: “Those” People Don’t Represent Me 
 The desire of those who are members of subaltern counter-
publics for recognition and the civil rights that come along 
with that recognition is informed by a humanistic ideal of 
acceptance of all types of people.  But when members of the 
counter-public initiate the process of demanding that 
recognition by performing their identities in the public sphere, 
conflicts emerge.  The particular representations being 
performed are challenged, even from within, as possibly 
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inappropriate representations for the purposes of political 
gain.  Challenged representations include what some read as the 
most extreme gay male images, which nevertheless are part of the 
“community,” such as the drag queen and the leatherman.  A 
battle ensues over the appropriate public imagery.  
During my early research on this project I encountered a 
very telling and revealing example of in-group contention, 
reflecting the challenges that ensue as a result of these public 
identity performances.  At the outset of my research, I 
formulated an online survey which was e-mailed to members of 
America Online who requested the survey after reading a profile 
I created under the online moniker GayResearchLA.  The aim of 
the survey was to gather individual gay males’ opinions about 
the kinds of representations they witnessed at Southern 
Decadence in the hopes of exploring these battles over public 
imaging. 
While my survey participants were limited in number, the 
responses to the questions I posed were extremely illuminating 
as regards these in-group contestations.5 One survey was answered 
by a couple and two by single people.  All respondents indicated 
their income as between $30,000 and $50,000.  Despite the 
narrowness of the range, the data gathered highlighted key 
issues. Respondents were asked to rate their relative agreement 
or disagreement with a series of statements using a scale of one 
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to five, one being “strongly agree” and five being “strongly 
disagree.”  The results demonstrated clear attitudes and 
strident opinions about the public imaging of gay males and 
provided one angle of entry into my study of this question.  The 
data showed that (1) participants recognized that the event 
could impact the community’s public image, (2) participants in 
Southern Decadence did not self-identify as a-political, and (3) 
participants believed the most appropriate gay male image to 
present was  
“the masculine man.” 
The results demonstrated that individual members of the gay 
community were aware that the community’s public image was at 
stake. While articles in the national gay press criticizing 
circuit parties6 for contributing to drug abuse and the rise of 
HIV infection regularly appeared around the time these surveys 
were taken, none of the three agreed with the statement, “Mass 
gay parties (like Southern Decadence) encourage unsafe sexual 
practices.”  One did, however, agree with the statement, “Mass 
gay parties give the gay community a bad reputation” (one was 
neutral on this statement).  The recognition that these mass gay 
parties could give the community as a whole a bad reputation 
seems to suggest that this respondent was mindful of the 
significations which attach to a community when it performs its 
identity in the public sphere. 
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Even though the executive director of LAGPAC implies that 
Southern Decadence was non-political, the participants I 
surveyed, at the least, were politically aware.  None believed 
that “There is already enough tolerance for gay people,” and all 
three were aware of the current legal battles for gay rights 
(marriage, sodomy laws, and adoption rights). Thus, the 
respondents understood the nature of the public images of gay 
men and what kinds of responses those images were likely to 
cause in members of the larger mainstream culture.   
Survey results also revealed varying attitudes towards 
types of images available for public view.  Two were neutral and 
one strongly disagreed with the statement, “I dislike non-
masculine men.”  Still, none suggested that “Leathermen and Drag 
Queens give the community a bad name.”7 Moreover, all three 
respondents characterized themselves as masculine.  I had been 
prompted to ask this question by Michelangelo Signorile who, in 
Life Outside – The Signorile Report on Gay Men: Sex, Drugs, 
Muscles and the Passages of Life, likened the pursuit of 
masculinity to the pursuit of muscularity and suggested that 
such a pursuit was facile, at best (xv-xxx).  Self-identified 
masculine men expressed dislike for those who had an effeminate 
personality (like drag queens or “queeny” men). This part of 
survey data reveals, I think, a general trend towards the 
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presentation of a normalized image – that of the masculine gay 
man (read: regular, just like straight).   
Near the end of this survey research, I had an instant 
messaging conversation with a man who I’ll simply refer to as 
Blond.8  In our exchange, the tensions surrounding public 
performances of gay identities that occur within members of the 
gay community as they put their own individual experiences up 
against a publicly proclaimed and formed identity were revealed:   
GayResearchLA: What do you think Southern Decadence says, 
if anything, about the gay community? 
Blond:  I as a Louisiana gay man have always thought of 
Southern Dec as our Gay Pride event. But as a masculine 
man, I still wish it wasn’t quite so queeny. 
GayResearchLA:  Explain “queeny.” 
Blond: nellie, flamboyant, drag queens. We have all seen 
the gay pride parades on TV and it seems that every picture 
that is shown is of some bearded man in drag. 
GayResearchLA: True . . . but there is a lot of leather as 
well.9 
Blond: yes, but usually extreme leather . . . very 
stereotypical images. 
GayResearchLA: Well, this goes to one of the questions in 
the survey.  Should politically minded gay people be 
worried about those images? 
 64
Blond:  I think so, I have been involved with politics for 
a number of years. 
Gay Research LA: Why should those images worry us? 
Blond:  because those seem to be the only images that many 
people get exposed to. Those of us who appear “normal” are 
seldom seen. Even those who work on our behalf seem 
stereotypical. 
GayResearchLA: Do all mass gay events like Southern 
Decadence run the risk of being “stereotypical?” [There was 
no response to this question during the remainder of the 
conversation.] 
Blond: [Giving an example of those who work on our behalf 
who seem stereotypical] Take Newt’s sister, if almost 
anyone sees her they immediately think “dyke.” 
Blond: I did like the guy who used to work for national 
review, he made a good impression I thought. 
GayResearchLA: Andrew Holleran? 
Blond: Yes, I think that was his name . . . sounds right. 
GayResearchLA:  Where did he make a good impression? 
Blond: I saw him on TV several times, Crossfire and such. 
He didn’t come across as a radical as so many seem to. 
Blond: of course NAMBLA hasn’t helped us much either.  
[NAMBLA is an acronym for North American Man/Boy Love 
Association.]  
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GayResearchLA: Let me ask you something . . . The gay 
community is supposedly founded on a humanistic ideal of 
acceptance of all types (somewhere in our ideology).  
Doesn’t that mean that we must accept groups like NAMBLA, 
leathermen, and drag queens, as well as transgendered and 
bisexuals? 
Blond:  I agree that we must accept that not all people are 
the same. NAMBLA however is a different situation. 
GayResearchLA: How so? 
Blond: We are not talking chicken hawks here [a reference 
to older gay men who seek to date younger men, generally 
those between 18 and 30, but Blond makes a distinction here 
that is not often made in the gay community].  We are 
talking about legally adult men who wish to have a sexual 
relationship with legally underage boys. That is not right. 
This exchange exposes how an in-group tension manifests when 
identities are publicly asserted.  These tensions (in no 
particular order) revolve around proper behavior of individuals 
in the public sphere, the relative inclusivity (or non-
inclusivity) of the gay male community, the limits that should 
(or should not) be placed on available, representative images, 
and the use of the event as a representative event similar to 
gay pride. 
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For instance, while clearly wanting to espouse an open-
minded approach (“we must accept that not all people are the 
same”) Blond does not believe that acceptance applies to 
“legally adult men” who are desirous of “legally underage boys.” 
How far towards inclusion must a gay/lesbian event go?  What are 
the underrepresented images at Southern Decadence?  For 
instance, in my redirection – “Doesn’t that mean that we must 
accept groups like NAMBLA, leathermen, and drag queens, as well 
as transgendered and bisexuals?” – I specifically mentioned gay 
male identities that have faced exclusion from the “gay 
mainstream.”  Blond does not respond to this redirection; he 
continues his focus on NAMBLA.   
Blond seems uncomfortable with some of the representations 
of queerness available at Southern Decadence – specifically 
leathermen and drag queens.  In the common queer imaginary, 
leathermen and drag queens have represented the gay political 
movement since its inception – for their part in the riots 
against police brutality at the Stonewall Inn.10  For the 
speaker, Southern Decadence is indeed a representative type of 
event: he equates it to gay pride festivities in other parts of 
the country (“our Gay Pride Event”).11  In total, the speaker 
seems to desire a more conservative approach to public 
performances of identities – one which would not prompt 
speculation in the mainstream that paints all gay people as 
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abnormal (“very extreme leather,” “stereotypical,” “dyke,” “he 
didn’t come across as radical”).12  Blond’s desire for the 
community to present a more mainstream image echoes Butler’s 
normalizing regime.  When an identity is presented in public, it 
becomes that kind of totalizing identity – attaching itself to 
all gay men.   
In the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on three 
aspects of public performances at Southern Decadence that seem 
most antithetical to this goal of mainstreaming the gay male 
community’s image.  One aspect that deserves focus is public 
sexual behavior at Southern Decadence, and the policing of that 
behavior from within the community.  The two other aspects are 
really publicly performed identities: the circuit boy and the 
leatherman.  
For a moment, I want to return to Lauren Berlant and 
Michael Warner’s essay “Sex in Public.”  The essay details two 
of the authors’ experiences with “sex practices;” in the 
relevant experience, the authors witnessed a “sex performance 
event” in which certain sexual practices were displayed. Such 
public display of nonheteronormative sexuality, according to the 
authors, lead to “the production of nonheteronormative bodily 
contexts” (367).  Their language is dense, but they are pointing 
to a safe space for all kinds of alternative sexualities that 
opens up when differing (nonheteronormative) sexualities are 
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performed in the public sphere. The point, generally, is that 
the gay rights movement should take, as its aim, the expansion 
of liberal attitudes towards all kinds of sexualities.  Clearly, 
the move towards conciliatory politics is antithetical to that 
aim.  The move towards conciliatory politics moves away from 
exaggerated displays of sexuality in public spaces (or from 
exaggerated identities put on display).  
The spectre of the public performance of actual sex 
practices haunts the edges of Southern Decadence as a 
phenomenon.  It is this spectre that subjects the event to 
protests.  For example, one pastor placed an advertisement in 
the Times-Picayune urging “the banishment of the festival” 
(“Pastor Takes,” par. 1). Public sexual activity is common at 
Southern Decadence.  The notion of Decadence, it seems, almost 
includes the idea of public sex.  Perhaps, despite the sheer 
numbers of people who now attend Southern Decadence, the insular 
nature of the event creates an atmosphere of permissiveness.  
The most striking part of these displays of public sexuality is 
their performance in often clear view of non-homosexual people 
in the French Quarter.  The radical, shocking nature of these 
public displays of sexual acts are indeed antithetical to the 
goal of assimilating the party into the larger tourist-oriented 
economy of the city.   During the first night of the festivities 
in 1998 (my second year of participation), an associate of mine 
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and I were standing on the corner of one of the streets in the 
Fruit Loop13 and watched the outrageous, often fearful 
expressions of heterosexuals as they passed through.  We laughed 
between ourselves and said, “You’re in the wrong part of the 
French Quarter this weekend, honey.”   
In September 1997, a full page ad was taken out in the 
Decadence issue of AmbushMag.  The ad welcomes readers to the 
French Quarter and asks them to “RESPECT our neighborhood,” 
further urging them not to urinate or have sex in the streets.  
The ad was sponsored by nearly all of the local bars and some 
retail stores.  At the bottom, the ad reads, “FOR YOUR 
PROTECTION/Louisiana is a sodomy statute state (minimum sentence 
5 years in Angola Prison)” (Figure 1C). The very exhibitionistic 
sexual activity that occurs obviously creates a sort of tension 
between visitors to Decadence and residents of the French 
Quarter.  The hope of the ad is that the Decadence participants 
will feel a kind of tension limiting their participation in 
public sexual activity.  The advertisement, I think, is also 
indicative of the move towards assimilation.  In urging visitors 
to respect the neighborhood and in noting the status of sodomy 
laws in the state, the creators of the ad were working to keep 
displays of public sexuality to a minimum. 
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During my time studying Decadence, I have often shared the 
subject of my research interest with colleagues.  One colleague 
shared a story of his participation in Decadence.  The colleague 
attended Decadence with little foreknowledge of the event, its 
history, or the public sex that often takes place.  Straight-
identified but not homophobic, the colleague was walking down 
the street when he happened upon the gay section of the quarter.  
In the middle of the very large crowd, a man in a wheelchair was 
performing oral sex on two different men.  Such expressions of 
sexuality are not uncommon.  During my own participation in 
Decadence, I have witnessed orgiastic affairs on the top of a 
podium in the middle of a dance floor in the middle of the day 
and many other sexual acts (Figure 1D).   
Figure 1C: Advertisement placed 
in AmbushMag 2000.   
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The claiming of this space by homosexual people for the 
weekend is clear – even if only by virtue of the large numbers 
of gay people present.  Still, the mere fact of such a large 
number of participants does not necessarily make this space a 
safe one for gay people or for such public (or semi-private) 
sexual acts.  In fact, one writer suggests that the inability of 
the police to stop public displays of sexual acts during the 
festivities encouraged them to raid gay bars prior to the event. 
In a 1999 article in the now-defunct Impact newsmagazine, 
Melinda Shelton reports on a raid that took place on Friday, 
August 27 (the week prior to the beginning of Decadence 
festivities).  The raid, on local bar Rawhide 2010, resulted in 
the arrest of 11 men who were ultimately charged with violating 
the state’s obscenity law (5).  The supposed result of an 
anonymous complaint, gay activists roundly criticized the police 
department for the timing and selection of the bar as a target.  
The department had previously raided the Phoenix on Elysian 
Figure 1D: Men dancing on the 
top of a podium in the middle of 
Oz nightclub, a gay bar in the 
French Quarter (from the 
author’s personal collection). 
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Fields during an advertised “underwear night.”  The Phoenix and 
Rawhide 2010 are the bars that are most patronized by 
leathermen.  During the Rawhide raid, 13 men were arrested on 
obscenity charges.   
Interestingly, I have not heard, recently, of any sorts of 
arrests either in bars or in public places for sexual activity.  
Apparently, in 2003, there was a concerted effort to provide 
security, to work with police and city officials, and to stop 
public sex.  According to Ambush, the campaign worked,  
Of 47 arrests made, there were no arrests for public sex 
over the weekend. This made the religious protests moot 
since this was their whole objective to stop Southern 
Decadence. Interestingly, the majority of the arrests took 
place between the 100 and 700 blocks of Bourbon, not in the 
GLBT business area of Bourbon between St. Ann and Dumaine. 
Two arrests were made in the GLBT area.  [ . . . People 
were] exposing themselves below the waist in order to 
obtain beads. (Naquin-Delain, par. 1) 
Those of the “organizers” who worked with the police to address 
the issue of public sex at Southern Decadence were not worried 
that the character of the event as a celebration of gay 
identities would be damaged by their efforts.  This move, 
towards conciliation and away from the desire to “shock” the 
sensibilities of those who might view these public performances 
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of identities is most evident through this attempt to rid 
Decadence of public sexual activity. 
Another public identity which is performed at Southern 
Decadence is the circuit boy. The circuit boy is a phenomenon 
tied to circuit parties – events which happen over three-to-four 
day weekends with all-night parties each night and a wrap-up 
party on Sundays.14   
The types of criticism leveled against self-identified 
circuit boys or alternatively, circuit queens, within the gay 
community are clearly expressed in a flyer, titled “Bitter 
Fruit,” which I came across in the French Quarter during 
Southern Decadence in 1999.  The author of the flyer, identified 
as Michael Congdon, had apparently written several “issues” of 
this newsletter prior to this one.  In the flyer, Congdon 
compares participants of Mardi Gras to participants of Southern 
Decadence.  He writes, “This is essential reading material for 
those of you who are visiting our seeping cesspool [ . . . ] I 
mean, Fair City!”  (A scan of the flyer is in Figure 1E). 
Congdon clearly dislikes the after-effects of both Southern 
Decadence and Mardi Gras; most importantly for our purposes, he 
clearly marks the position many participants of the circuit 
occupy in the gay male community by his references to drug and 
alcohol death (and comas) and cracked out circuit queens. By 
referencing “drunk, pretentious bitchy fags from Miami who don’t  
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understand the term community,” Congdon is also marking “circuit 
queens” who tend towards exclusivity based on body type or 
image.  Aside from his general dislike of tourists to the French 
Quarter, I interpret Congdon as directly attacking the “circuit 
queen” or circuit boy. Nowhere in the flyer does he mention the 
self-identified bears (generally hirsute men whose bodies might 
Figure 1E: “Bitter Fruit” – a flyer found in a bar in New 
Orleans in September of 1999 (from the author’s personal 
collection). 
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best be described as average; i.e.: non-muscular and usually 
heavy) or leathermen, for example. This attack, I think, is 
indicative of the anxiety gay males feel as a result of the 
exclusionary practices of the circuit.   
One source of Congdon’s anxiety over the presence of 
circuit boys and the circuit and its participants is that it 
tends to be an exclusive club, antithetical to the more 
inclusive aims of the larger gay movement.  Participants in the 
circuit not only seek those who are masculine (as defined by the 
very specific body image) but, they also seek those who are most 
like them (also in terms of body image).  Thus, the parties on 
the circuit tend to exclude, if only on the basis of mass 
inclusion of only certain types.  The circuit is then a public 
performance of a body image which excludes other identity 
performances.  Conversely, because of its particular history, 
Southern Decadence tends to be much more inclusive of multiple 
identity performances (even “circuit queens”). 
Circuit parties, generally, tend to promote an idealized 
body type, and while anyone could purchase a ticket to a circuit 
event, a bear or a leatherman might feel out of place at such an 
event.  One of Michelangelo Signorile’s interviewees makes his 
definition of this idealized, exlusionary body image quite 
clear: 
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Big, built, strong. I definitely like very masculine guys; 
I don’t want to use the politically incorrect term 
‘straight-acting’ and I don’t think it applies anyway, 
since who is to say that ‘masculine’ means ‘straight’ but 
anyway, you get the idea of the kind of guys I like. (18) 
Despite the speaker’s statements to the contrary, I would argue 
that for him “Big, built, strong” is akin to “masculine” which 
is akin to “straight-acting.”  His discussion of these three 
separate terms within the same utterance belies the speaker’s 
words.  By and large, Southern Decadence’s history has not been 
about the promotion of identities which could be interpreted as 
straight-acting (circuit boys are not, necessarily, interpreted 
by the larger gay male culture as straight-acting, either).  
Still, the circuit boy is one gay male identity staged during 
the weekend of Southern Decadence.  It is one gay male identity 
that, clearly, causes an internal contestation of the “proper” 
identity to put forward in the public sphere.  Moreover, I think 
the presence of the circuit (and its attendees) is contested 
because Southern Decadence initially developed as a party where 
multiple gay images could flourish and the exclusionary nature 
of the circuit seems to question that status. 
 The exact opposites of the muscular, hairless circuit boy – 
leathermen and bears participate in Southern Decadence in large 
numbers.  The “leatherman” is another publicly performed 
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identity at Southern Decadence and rather than the muscular 
hairless body of the circuit boy, leathermen and bears have 
average and hairy bodies.  In the leatherman, there is a kind of 
hyper-masculinity (not related to muscularity).  The 
sadomasichistic sexual choices of the leatherman are seen as too 
“extreme” (IM conversation) to fit within the rubric of a gay 
and lesbian (there are leather-women, too) identity created for 
consumption by the mainstream. 
The leatherman and his costuming became specifically 
identified with sadomasochistic sexual and lifestyle/ 
relationship choices.  Many men still hold to a very strict 
dress code – a code which identifies the man’s choice of sexual 
position and fetishes.  The dress code can be so strict as to 
provide pre-determined types of clothing (for instance, 
handkerchiefs in particular pockets) depending on a person’s 
chosen sexual position.   
“Extreme” leathermen seem to be out of vogue in the gay 
community.15  By “extreme,” I mean to suggest that leathermen who 
still identify publicly as such and publicly announce their 
sadomasochistic sexual choices are few.  Tony Mills, 
International Mr. Leather 1998, revealed in an interview the 
separation of the leatherman from his sexual choices.  Mills is 
quoted references his title, “[International Mr. Leather is] the 
gay male equivalent of Miss America, except they don’t give 
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roses.”  (The title is most decidedly not the equivalent of Miss 
America; there are drag queen pageants that might more 
appropriately equate to that pageant.) The writer goes on, 
“Within the context of guys whose apparel choice is black 
leather and denim, the title represents a mix of sex symbol, 
role model and fantasy figure.”   His analogy distinctly 
separates the nature of leather from sexual choice; being a 
leatherman is about a choice of clothing and not on one’s 
preference for sadomasochism.   
Although Mills later acknowledges a multi-dimensionality in 
leathermen, that multi-dimensionality is based on costume and 
not on sexual choices; “I have Saville Row suites in my closet, 
and I have my leather wear.”  A doctor, Mills clearly attempts, 
I think, to distance himself from publicizing the sexuality that 
automatically attaches to the figure of the leatherman – a 
sexuality with which many in the gay community are 
uncomfortable. 
Politically, although leathermen are commonly thought to 
have been shepherds of the gay movement from its beginnings, 
leathermen are increasingly seen as “too extreme” for the 
mainstream public’s imaginary.  The gay male identity seems to 
exclude a specifically sexual being such as this figure.  The 
current normalizing regime of gay male identity, then, is 
forcing the leatherman back into the closet.  Mills’ refusal to 
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acknowledge his sexual identity in the mainstream press is 
indicative of this trend. 
 
Southern Decadence: A Microcosm of Gay Identities, In Public 
 In this chapter, I have explored the phenomenon of Southern 
Decadence as a microcosm of the history of the gay movement’s 
struggles from its early days to the recent past.  I’ve examined 
the kinds of stereotyped images that are available for viewing 
at Southern Decadence.  These images cause, within an individual 
gay man who compares himself to them, a kind of questioning, a 
contestation of those identities as “not like me.”   
 The history Southern Decadence demonstrates the movement’s 
early step towards full citizenship by simply “going public,” 
making a gay male identity (construed for years as a “private” 
identity) a public identity – “coming out” en masse.  Moreover, 
I have traced the movement from that beginning desire to simply 
the early twenty-first century desire to achieve political aims 
through conciliation.  The various identities performed at 
Southern Decadence – the drag queen, the leatherman, the circuit 
boy and the public sex participant – spark as conciliation is 
embraced by some yet rejected by others.  In the final analysis, 
a full range of identities are presented at Southern Decadence, 
despite attempts to control the public imaging of the gay man.  
Southern Decadence remains a space, intriguingly, which can work 
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both towards conciliation and still allow for this panoply of 




1 The gay and lesbian political movement is commonly assumed to 
have begun following the Stonewall Riots, riots which occurred 
at the Stonewall Inn bar in New York after police raided the 
establishment. 
 
2 D’Emilio points out that his argument is somewhat dangerous to 
political activists, who had been (at the time of his writing) 
suggesting a “grand historical” narrative of the existence of 
gay and lesbian people – that gays and lesbians had indeed 
existed for all time and would continue to exist. 
 
3 Although I had known at least since 1990, of the existence of 
Southern Decadence (a local gay bar in Memphis often displayed 
video taken on the streets of New Orleans during the weekend’s 
festivities), the article served as my entry point for the 
festivities.  The next year was my first year in attendance. 
 
4 Rooms alone can range between $99 and $300 for one night – 
depending on the hotel’s location in relationship to the French 
Quarter or special deals that may be offered. I have spent 
upwards of $750, not including airfare, at times during my 
participation in the weekend long event. 
 
5 Each of the surveys was gathered online.  All participants were 
informed that this survey would be used in a study on gay 
identity.  Although an attempt at ethnographic exploration, 
these surveys clearly are not scientific in nature; rather, they 
are used here as examples of contestation. 
 
6 Circuit parties are parties that are attended by large numbers 
of predominantly gay men.  Generally, they last an entire 
weekend with events (primarily dances) each night often lasting 
all night long.   
 
7 Leathermen, in common gay male parlance, are men who dress in 
particular leather costuming and often participate in 
sadomasochistic sexual practices.  They are often highly self-




8 The privacy of my research subject, in this instance was 
guaranteed, so I am not referring to him by his online moniker. 
 
9 Blond refers to himself as masculine – and not queeny. 
 
10 As Martin Duberman’s Stonewall suggests, this interpretation 
of the Stonewall Riots has the character of a mythology.  I 
cannot dedicate space to historicizing this myth here.  However, 
Duberman writes, “We have, since 1969, been trading the same few 
tales about the riots from the same few accounts – trading them 
for so long that they have transmogrified into simplistic myth” 
(xv). 
 
11 In truth, Southern Decadence is not the gay pride event in New 
Orleans.  New Orleans’ gay pride festivities occur in October on 
National Coming Out Day.  However, his suggestion may have some 
validity as Southern Decadence does have a much longer history – 
a history not unlike that of gay pride marches and parades. 
 
12 For much of the work in this chapter, I am indebted to the 
methodology of constructing performance genealogies proposed by 
Roach, which includes ethnographic work as a “participant-
observer.”  This method of observation comes from Michel de 
Certeau’s influential essay in cultural studies, “Walking in the 
City.”   In recent years, a strict anthropological participant-
observer mode of knowledge gathering has been complicated.  
Dwight Conquergood (an ethnographer and performance studies 
scholar at Northwestern University), following Johanness Fabian, 
calls for an “ethnography of the ears and heart the reimagines 
participant-observation as coperformative witnessing” (149).  He 
also identifies three characteristics of knowledge: (1) “it is 
located” (at a particular time and place); (2) “it must be 
engaged” (versus presented as abstracted information); and, (3) 
“it is forged from solidarity with, not separation from, the 
people.”  A coperformative witnessing requires participation in 
solidarity with the people who are subjects of the study.  This 
mode of knowing is most certainly the mode of knowing with which 
I have approached the subject of gay and lesbian identities. 
 
13 If one walks down Bourbon towards the Bywater district from 
Canal St, the gay and lesbian section of the Quarter begins, 
roughly, at the corner of Bourbon and St. Ann streets.  It is 
one corner of an L-shaped route identified, in the spirit of 





14 Southern Decadence has been likened to a circuit party 
(predominantly in the gay and lesbian press).  These parties are 
usually marketed nationally and raise funds for local community 
service organizations (generally, AIDS service organizations). 
There are clear differences between Decadence and circuit 
parties; Decadence is not organized by a central committee and 
no funds are raised. Over the years, the fundraising 
effectiveness of these parties has been called into question.  
Party promoters, without any particular attachment to a 
community organization, have organized and thrown these parties 
with little of the profits going to aid these organizations. 
 
15 The reader will remember that the IM speaker in the 




STANDING IN FOR . . . : 
BATTLES OVER THE PUBLIC MEMORY  
AND DEATH OF MATTHEW SHEPARD 
 
In its first feature article on the beating of Matthew 
Shepard, the Washington Post reported, “Matthew Shepard, slight 
of stature, gentle of demeanor [ . . . ] was tied to a fence 
like a dead coyote [ . . . with] his head badly battered and 
burn marks on his body” (qtd. in Ott and Aoki 487).  Through 
their creation of this tragic narrative, the Post and other 
media outlets began the process of configuring the public memory 
of Matthew Shepard.  This Washington Post article, 
representative of the media coverage surrounding the death of 
Matthew Shepard, a gay student brutally tortured and murdered at 
the hands of homophobic assailants, shows how the battles over 
the public memory of this young man began even before his death. 
(Following the beating, Shepard died after being in a coma for 
four days.)   
Thrust onto the national stage by the media’s almost 
instantaneous coverage, Matthew Shepard came to stand in for – 
to symbolize – the gay rights movement and one of its political 
goals, the advancement of hate crimes legislation. The death of 
Matthew Shepard spawned immediate responses in the media and 
communal gathering places.  For example, gay and lesbian people 
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across the country took to the streets in memorial vigils for 
Shepard.  Almost as instantaneously, he was memorialized on web 
sites.  (An internet search for his name prompted some 20,000 
plus results.)    
The battles over the public memory of Matthew Shepard and 
his proper role as a surrogate continue today, throughout the 
United States.  His death and place in the culture’s collective 
memory are the focus of one play, The Laramie Project,1 and two 
television movies: one on NBC and the other – a movie version of 
the play – on HBO. Shepard’s family launched a foundation in his 
honor, with the goal of educating the public about hate crimes 
and the need for hate crimes legislation. The meaning of his 
death for the political aims of gay people, for the lives of 
individual gay men, and for the socially conservative religious 
right conservatives continues to be debated within the public 
sphere.   
This chapter examines the debates over Matthew Shepard’s 
role as a surrogate in the collective public memory.  As it 
became clear, in the days and weeks following his death, that 
the story of Matthew Shepard would get national attention, 
leaders in the gay community moved to characterize Shepard as an 
example of the many gay men killed in hate crimes.  They used 
the death as a launching point from which to advance hate crimes 
legislation.2 Other groups argued against this surrogation.  At 
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his funeral, religious extremists protested the gay community’s 
use of Shepard; even within the gay community itself – as 
evidenced in the gay press – many speculated about the 
particular reasons why the use of Shepard might do detriment to 
some broader aims of the gay rights movement.   
In the introduction, I suggest that performances of gay 
identities are always sited. “Site-ing” – or the marking down of 
a place where these performances happen – is much more 
definitive in the first chapter, since Southern Decadence occurs 
at an actual physical location – the French Quarter and its 
streets and bars – and in temporal space – Labor Day weekends 
(from circa 1972 to the present).  In this case, however, “site-
ing” is not so straightforward.   
Performances of Shepard’s identity in the public sphere 
were an attempt to create and control public memory.  In an 
article that recounts three public commemorations of Sojourner 
Truth, Roseann Mandziuk poses the problems inherent in the 
process of creating public memory: 
Inevitably, public memory is an ideological process, one 
that will privilege some meanings over others and functions 
to exclude and forget as much as it includes and remembers 
[ . . . ] the rhetorical limits of the “monument” allow 
little room for complexity, reflection or challenge. (289) 
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Mandziuk accurately summarizes the problem with “site-ing” 
public memory.  The creation of public memory is a process that 
spans years of debate.  For instance, Mandziuk’s article focuses 
on the creation of memorials to Sojourner Truth.  Additionally, 
a singular figure (like Shepard as symbol or a monument) is 
unable to embody the complexities inherent in events and people. 
In this chapter, I examine the ideological processes that 
informed the creation of Matthew Shepard as surrogate within the 
site of public memory.  I also examine, the complexities and 
challenges that various constructions of Matthew Shepard (by 
various groups) created.3 
 
Historical, Sited Matthew Shepard 
The media, en masse, is one area of public discourse within 
which public memory is created.  The media packaged Matthew 
Shepard – in print, on television, and on the stage – for 
cultural consumption as an angelic figure, worthy of protection. 
The media’s treatment of the Shepard story did highlight the 
political goal of passing hate crimes legislation.  However, the 
media packaged the Matthew Shepard story in a specific way to 
achieve its goal of telling a dramatic story.  While many gays 
were pleased with the media’s retelling, others have suggested 
that this instance of public imaging of gay people may have had 
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negative consequences.  What has been the eventual result of the 
media’s dramatic packaging of Shepard as angelic, pure victim? 
Because of the media’s nearly instantaneous repackaging of 
Shepard’s story, the debate over the public memory of Matthew 
Shepard continues to the present day.  I examine two parts of 
this debate – each of which can be said to inhabit their own 
cultural spaces.  One cultural space is that inhabited by 
religious extremists and one is inhabited by gay people.  
Religious extremists from the conservative political spectrum 
criticized the media and the gay community for capitalizing on 
Shepard’s death; some extremists staged a protest at his 
funeral. Friends of Shepard’s responded with their own brand of 
political speech; while within the gay community, the debate 
centered on why Shepard should serve as a surrogate when so many 
others had died in a similar fashion. 
The media’s creation of Shepard as a “pure” victim of a 
hate crime fit well with gay political goals in the late 1990s.  
As noted in the first chapter, Shepard’s death came at a time of 
major advances for the gay rights movement.  The year before 
Shepard’s death (October 12, 1998) was the year when the 
movement saw a number of advances on a national scale.  Within 
the uses of Matthew Shepard as surrogate, we can see the ways in 
which the movement – nationally – had moved from a 
confrontational to a conciliatory style of politics.   
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The movement was able to suggest that Shepard should have 
been safe in his community, in this bar where he met his 
killers.  Shepard came to stand in for the fears of gay people.  
The movement was urging the public to examine this event as 
indicative of similar situations gay men faced every day.  By 
arguing that Shepard – the angelic, pale boy – could be killed 
only because he was gay, the movement affirmed the media’s 
portrayal of Shepard as a victim and played on the public’s 
fears of victimization.  The gay community, I suggest, was 
arguing, “We are like you, and we are deserving of the same 
protections from hate as you are.”  The story of Matthew Shepard 
has proven to be powerful, for he continues to serve in this 
role as a surrogate for all gay victims of hate crimes, almost 
seven years after his death. 
 Matthew Shepard was not the first to die at the hands of 
assailants because he was gay nor was he the last.  Press 
descriptions of Shepard recall his “slight [ . . . ] stature,” 
his “gentle [ . . . ] demeanor” (Ott and Aoki 487), his 
whiteness, his youth, and his intelligence. Matthew Shepard – as 
a result of the intense media coverage – came to stand in for 
and embody a whole host of anxieties and uncertainties within 
gay politics and within the mainstream as well.  In the gay 
community, Shepard came to represent gay individuals’ fears of 
being murdered as a result of their orientation.  In the minds 
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of religious extremists, Shepard came to stand in as a symbol of 
the moral decline of the country (due to its positive treatment 
of gay people).   
 The process of surrogation begins at the time of death; a 
metaphorical space (in need of filling) is left in the public 
consciousness.  When someone dies (for instance, Matthew 
Shepard, a King, or the actor, Thomas Betterton, to use Joseph 
Roach’s example from the book Cities of the Dead), a kind of 
cultural anxiety surrounds the death.  Individuals in the 
culture attempt to wrest control of the image of the individual 
who died in order to fill the physical/cultural space left by 
the body of that individual.  Thus, through the process of 
surrogation, an individual figure comes to serve as a symbol – 
embodying, after death, what he seemed to embody in life.     
In his writing on surrogation, Joseph Roach references the 
death and funeral spectacles of kings.  A space is held open for 
the ultimate kingly successor, 
But in the place that is being held open there also exists 
an invisible network [ . . . constituting] the imagined 
community.  In that place also is a breeding ground of 
anxieties and uncertainties about what the community should 
be. (39 emphasis added) 
The space that is held open, then, forms the place for 
idealistic debates about the nature of the community – about 
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what it can become and what changes can happen in its character 
as a result of the kingly death.  In later chapters of Roach’s 
book, he expands the notion of surrogation to argue that Thomas 
Betterton, upon his death, came to stand in for a particular 
nationalist British identity, not unlike how Shepard came to 
stand in on the one hand, for hate crimes, and on the other, the 
country’s moral decline. 
 Roach’s work suggests that the process of surrogation 
occurs after the death of someone who in life had been in the 
public’s consciousness, like a king or an actor.  With the 
advent of the twenty-four hour news cycle, broadcast and print 
media have come to play an ever more increasing role in 
publicizing a death so that even an unknown like Shepard can 
become a national symbol.  This transformation is not unlike 
that which happened following the death of Princess Diana, who 
became an international symbol.  Diana Taylor suggests that only 
particular kinds of individuals come to serve as surrogates for 
multiple publics en-masse (67).  Other individuals serve only as 
surrogates for smaller counter-publics within the public at-
large.  For instance, while Diana seemed to serve as a surrogate 
within multiple publics across national and cultural borders, 
Latina singer Selena did not. 
Contrasting the death and “theatre of mourning” which 
resulted from the death of Latina songstress Selena with that 
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which resulted from the death of Princess Diana, Taylor finds 
that Selena’s death did not provoke the same kind of worldwide 
reaction and media coverage that Diana’s did. This difference 
prompts Taylor to ask “How, then, do some ghosts dance over 
cultural boundaries [into public memory] while others are 
stopped, strip-searched, and denied entry” (68)? Taylor suggests 
that culturally-defined beauty is the trope by which certain 
individuals come to serve as surrogates.  She quotes Elizabeth 
Bronfen,  
Over [a beautiful woman’s] dead body, cultural norms are 
reconfigured or secured, whether because the sacrifice of 
the virtuous, innocent woman serves a social critique and 
transformation or because a sacrifice of the dangerous 
woman reestablishes an order that was momentarily suspended 
due to her presence. (67) 
A dead person (particularly a beautiful dead person) comes to 
serve a role in societal reengineering: the death of a dangerous 
individual restores social order; the death of an innocent 
becomes the means to achieve a societal transformation. 
Certainly, Selena was a beautiful woman, but she was stopped at 
the border of the American Latino culture because, Taylor 
asserts, of her ethnicity.  Diana, in her innocent whiteness, 
served the role of the virtuous woman killed before her time and 
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as an indictment on the royal culture (and the paparazzi) that 
drove her to her death. 
Like Princess Diana and like Bronfen’s beautiful woman, the 
white and innocent Matthew Shepard came to symbolize the figure 
of the innocent, worthy of protection from violence.  
Understanding the “politics of cultural transmission” (Taylor 
67), the gay community did little to dispel the media’s 
characterization.  However, the characterization of Shepard as 
innocent resulted in counter-imaging from religious extremists 
and prompted further debate within the gay community as to the 
proper role (or not) of Shepard as a representative of gay men. 
Not unlike the death of Princess Diana, Shepard’s death 
served as a kind of flashpoint around which cultural anxieties 
about his death were played out. In the introduction to the 
published version of The Laramie Project Moises Kaufman, (the 
founder and leader of the Tectonic Theatre Project) defines such 
flashpoints as 
[ . . . ] moments in history when a particular event brings 
the various ideologies and beliefs prevailing in a culture 
into sharp focus.  At these junctures, the event becomes a 
lightning rod of sorts, attracting and distilling the 
essence of these philosophies and convictions.  By paying 
careful attention in moments like this to people’s words, 
one is able to hear the way these prevailing ideas affect 
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not only individual lives but also the culture at large. 
(v) 
Generally, Kaufman’s definition serves this project well.  
Suddenly, lawmakers were urging the passage of hate crimes 
legislation, arguing that all citizens of the United States – 
including gay citizens – had the right of free association 
without fear of violence. 
The packaging of Matthew Shepard began the moment his 
beating was reported to the media.  I define packaging as the 
way in which the media (especially broadcast) take the facts of 
an event and package them into a dramatic story.  Clearly, the 
media reports on this event were packaged.  In my study of 
Shepard, though, I have often wondered how the media were first 
alerted to the beating.  In fact, two men who knew Shepard (but 
may not have been close to him) initially contacted a reporter 
from a nearby community’s newspaper.  In Out magazine, Elise 
Harris reports that Walt Boulden, a social worker who had known 
Matt for about six years, and Alex Trout, a “dramatic, angry 
young man” who had “spoken a lot to the press [ . . . ] called a 
friend at the Casper Star-Tribune. The reporter drove to Laramie 
and took on the case;” they were “afraid that the crime would be 
covered up” (63). 
Boulden and Trout were later denied access to Shepard’s 
funeral by his mother; the implication, according to Harris, was 
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that Boulden and Trout were to be blamed for the unprecedented 
media attention and may even have been complicit in the 
packaging of Matthew Shepard (63).  These two witnesses were 
politically savvy, and their desire to expose the beating of 
Matthew Shepard seems driven by the political goal of ensuring 
the crime would be interpreted, en masse, as a hate crime. 
 Harris continues, “By October 9, the Associated Press was 
calling Shepard a ‘gay student’ and the assault a hate crime. It 
was a slow news week, halfway between the Clinton-Lewinksy 
scandal and the midterm elections, and the story blew up” (63).  
The media, then, according to Harris, picked up on and 
dramatized the story for its dramatic character. Brian Ott and 
Eric Aoki point to the dramatic nature of the coverage, as well.  
Both within mainstream media and gay-identified media, they 
write, the coverage served only “to excuse the public of any 
social culpability” by labeling the criminals the guilty parties 
instead of labeling the public’s homophobia as the true 
initiator of the murder: 
All three of the national newspapers we analyzed [1] named 
the event as a vicious anti-gay hate crime, [2] constructed 
Shepard as a political symbol of gay rights, and [3] 
transferred the public’s guilt onto [Aaron] McKinney and 
[Russell] Henderson [Shepard’s killers]. (497) 
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Because the media victimized Shepard and criminalized 
McKinney and Henderson, it ensured the public would not examine 
any societal causes of the crime.  Ott and Aoki further argue 
that the media actually damaged progress towards the political 
goal of passage of hate crimes legislation.  They only use 
recent history as evidence for that argument (that hate crimes 
legislation is stalled in the United States House of 
Representatives, for instance).  Still, Ott and Aoki’s 
criticisms are not far from those that come from within the gay 
community, as we will see later in the chapter. Significantly, 
Ott and Aoki expose the media’s easily recognizable narratives 
into which they feed the various stories they cover.  For 
instance, one of the communal narratives that the media used in 
its coverage of the Shepard story was the narrative of rural, 
western America. 
Jean Baudrillard criticizes the role of the media in its 
use and exposition of communal narratives.  Through its 
packaging and retelling of stories, the media participates only 
in “farcical resurrection” and  
[ . . . ] parodic evocation of that which is already no 
more – of that which is ‘consumed’ in the original sense of 
the word (consummated and terminated). (qtd. in Kellner 63) 
Hence, the media works to repackage things that have already 
happened in a way that the culture, at large, can appropriately 
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consume them.  The media, then, is one of the primary agents of 
surrogation through its creation of viable narratives for public 
consumption. 
By and large the popular perception of rural America is 
that it is predominantly conservative and that rural citizens 
are closed-minded people.  In its encapsulation of the scene of 
Shepard’s murder, the media uses this construct.  While the 
media does clearly place the blame on the perpetrators, it also 
suggests that the rural nature of the very town in which the 
murder occurred shared some of the blame: 
Laramie, Wyoming – often called the Gem City of the Plains 
– is now at the eye of the storm. The cowboy state has its 
rednecks and yahoos for sure, but there are no more bigots 
per capita in Wyoming than there are in [other states]. The 
difference is that in Wyoming there are fewer places to 
blend in [ . . . ] Aaron McKinney and his friend Russell 
Henderson came from the poor side of town. Both were from 
broken homes and as teenagers they had run-ins with the 
law. They lived in trailer parks [ . . . ] As a gay college 
student lay hospitalized in critical condition after a 
severe beating [ . . . ] this small city, which bills 
itself as Wyoming’s Hometown, wrestled with its attitudes 
towards gay men. [ . . . ] It’s a tough business, as Matt 
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Shepard knew, and as his friends all know, to be gay in 
cowboy country. (The Laramie Project 46-8) 
Thus, the play builds on the media’s early packaging of the 
event as a specifically rural beating (it couldn’t happen in 
cities) perpetrated by adults who’d been raised improperly and 
who had run-ins with the law (victim-perpetrators) on a victim 
who knew how hard it was to be gay in a rural area.  Matthew 
Shepard, in the play and in the media’s coverage, seemingly 
comes to stand in for all gay men who live in rural areas.  The 
packaging created a distancing effect, whereby residents of 
urban areas could deny that they could be victims of this kind 
of crime. 
In that The Laramie Project also seems to follow a kind of 
pre-determined narrative, the play may be interpreted as another 
form of media product.  In an article in Modern Drama, Amy 
Tigner suggests that The Laramie Project incorporates elements 
of pastoral drama and the western – a truly “American” story.  
She clearly points to the broader message of the play: “The 
Laramie Project’s discussion of gay life in Laramie is really a 
discussion of gay life in America” (152).  She further argues 
that, as the hero of “an elegiac pastoral Western,” “Matthew 
Shepard’s absence can begin to stand in for all the unnamed 
hate-crimes victims” (154).  In working through the community’s 
responses to his death, Tigner sees a possibility of individual 
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and corporal change coming as a result of the play; “As the 
pastoral works to critique and change society, The Laramie 
Project [ . . . ] may have had a real effect on social change” 
(153). 
Still other academics find little possibility of communal 
change in media representations of the Shepard incident.  Ryan 
Quist and Douglas Weigand analyzed the political motivations 
behind the media coverage.  They found that media outlets which 
were generally seen as more conservative attributed Shepard’s 
murder directly to the perpetrators, whereas media outlets seen 
as generally more liberal attributed it to the larger social 
problem of homophobia and hate violence (93).  Irrespective of 
this motivational bias, the gay community was, on some level, 
ready to accept and use the media’s characterizations to advance 
its political goals.  For example, Shepard is continually 
memorialized by national gay rights organizations and pointed to 
as an example of a gay man killed in a hate crime.  
 
We’re Everywhere: A New, Rural Identity for Queers 
 In truth, some change in communal understanding did result 
from Shepard’s death.  Shepard came to stand in for a Western, 
rural queer. In fact, the rural queer has emerged as one of the 
most prominent themes during the six or so years of media 
coverage.  We must question the value of such coverage, of 
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course.  In the media’s packaging of the West, we are reminded 
of a relatively conservative notion of the West as the “pure” 
America, inhabited only by “tough” gay people (and presumably 
“tough” ones that keep their identities secret).  An out gay man 
in the West is dangerous and subjected to violence, because gay 
westerners challenge the cultural notion of the West and rural 
America as a bastion of conservativism. 
Clearly, “tough” or not, gay people live all over the 
country – in both rural and urban areas.  John D’Emilio’s 
argument that, as the space is created for gays to safely expose 
their sexuality, more will do so, is important here.  Although 
D’Emilio’s argument focuses on cities as the place where 
individuals are freed from the restrictions of family, his 
argument can extend to rural spaces.  As more gay people openly 
self-identify in small-town America, more will see that 
lifestyle as a possible option for them.  These open self-
identifications as rural queers suggests a new social moment. 
Obviously, Matthew Shepard felt some level of comfort being 
openly gay in the small town.  He had lived in major 
metropolitan areas, but had chosen to return home. On campus, a 
group of gay people met regularly.  Defining how comfortable 
Shepard was being openly gay in Laramie is difficult.  
Nevertheless, Matthew Shepard came to serve as a surrogate for 
the expansion of gay visibility in new places. 
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Most obvious in media readings of Shepard and in The 
Laramie Project is that danger comes with the choices of gay 
people to live in rural areas.  Clearly, in some cases, a rural 
homosexual male or female may not openly identify as a gay man 
or lesbian woman without being subjected to violence. Open 
identification as a gay man or lesbian woman, so the story would 
have it, results in murder.  Living as a transgendered person, 
like Brandon Teena in Lincoln, Nebraska, also subjects one to 
violence.  Interestingly, like many other victims of hate 
violence, Teena (who’s birth name was Teena Brandon) has not 
become a surrogate promoted by gay political organizations in 
the same way as Shepard.  In comparison, Teena was neither 
middle-class like Shepard nor so easily packaged as a victim; 
she crossed gender lines to live as a man and dated a Lincoln 
woman.  Seemingly, any challenge to the sex-gender system as it 
is understood in conventional conservativist rural America 
subjects an individual to danger.  However, not all those 
subjected to this violence come to serve as surrogates. 
 For instance, parts of the transcript of Aaron McKinney’s 
trial – at which his confession to Rob Debree, a sergeant in the 
local Sherrif’s office, is read into the record – are reprinted 
in The Laramie Project.  Even before Shepard spoke, he was a 
target of McKinney and Henderson’s homophobic attitudes. 
McKinney refers to Shepard as “some kid who wanted a ride home.” 
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When prompted to describe Shepard’s looks, McKinney replies, 
“Mmm, like such a queer.  Such a queer dude.  [ . . .]like a 
fag, you know?”  Debree asks, “When did you and Russ talk about 
jacking him up?” and McKinney replied that they “kinda talked 
about it at the bar” (89-90).  Thus, the ground was already laid 
for Shepard to be beaten when he, according to McKinney, started 
“grabbing my leg and grabbing my genitals.”  (McKinney argues 
that happened after Shepard was in the truck with the two).  
McKinney is representative, then, of the assumed, standard 
homophobia of the rural West. 
 In another exchange in The Laramie Project, Doc O’Connor – 
the limousine driver who drove Matthew Shepard to Fort Collins, 
Colorado gay bars – clearly identifies the difference between 
acting gay and being gay in a rural area: 
Let me tell you something else here.  There’s more gay 
people in Wyoming than meets the eye.  [ . . . ] They’re 
not particularly, ah, the whattayou call them, the queens, 
the gay people, the queens, you know runaround faggot-type 
people. [ . . . ] I always say, Don’t fuck with a Wyoming 
queer, ‘cause they will kick you in your fucking ass. 
[ . . . ] I know a lot of gay people in Wyoming. (21) 
The “lot” of gay people O’Connor knows in Wyoming is not 
comprised, significantly, by “queeny” gay people.  That is to 
say that these gay people do not by their existence question the 
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traditional sex-gender system in rural America.  These are 
cowboy queers who will “kick-ass.”  I am reminded of the 
masculine gay male with which my IM converser, Blond, so 
identified in Chapter One.  A masculine gay male – like these 
rural queers – has set his identity in opposition to the 
feminized gay male represented in the figure of Shepard. 
Gay men who lived in rural areas thirty years ago (and even 
some today) certainly did not openly identify as such.  Queers 
do, however, live in rural areas.  A recent search of online 
chat rooms identified with the M4M tag (Men for Men) such as the 
Wyoming Men for Men chat room on the website www.gay.com 
evidences this fact.  Some forty people are frequenting the 
Gay.com chat area at any one time; some identified as gay and 
some as bisexual.  Other rural “chat” areas like the 
Springfield, Missouri chat room have a similar number of 
participants. (In contrast, urban areas like Houston or Las 
Vegas on this site often have over 100 people.)  These limited 
searches do indicate that self-identified (if not publicly 
identified) gay men do indeed live in rural areas.  That a gay 
man would or could live even modestly openly in a rural area 
would have been unthinkable just a half-century ago 
Gay men who live in rural assume a level of fear that 
contradicts the move of other gays toward visibility.  Some 
rural queers denounce it.  There are two very clear examples of 
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this fear in The Laramie Project.  In the play, Laramie is 
characterized as perhaps the most liberal of the small towns in 
the state because of the presence of the University of Wyoming.  
Still, Cathy Connolly (a member of the faculty) recounted for 
the writers a story about a woman calling her at her office 
because the woman (who remains unidentified) wanted to reach out 
to another lesbian.  Connolly says, “…she was – a kind of 
lesbian who knew I was coming and she wanted to come over and 
meet me immediately.”  The woman also told her that there were 
other lesbians in Laramie who refused to be seen with her, that 
“just to be seen with me could be a problem” (22). 
Similarly, Jonas Slonaker reported that he would often 
travel to gay bars in Denver and that he would meet other gay 
men from Laramie there.  Many would say, “I had to get out.”  
Some would, on the other hand, say “I mean I really love it 
there, that’s where I want to live.”  Slonaker’s unspoken retort 
was “If that’s where you want to live, do it.”  He corrected 
himself for the interviewer: “But it’s easier said than done, of 
course” (22-23).  As a gay man, Slonaker made a choice to live 
in the rural Wyoming town.  Yet, he understands the dangers 
inherent in that choice.  Such a choice is, indeed, “easier 
said” than made.  Slonaker seems to recognize that the choice is 
one fraught with danger, but understands that the choice breaks 
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new ground – gay men should be able to live anywhere they want 
to if they are to be full citizens.  
Still, while many gay men have made the choice to live in 
rural areas, many others have not.  As a gay man, for instance, 
I have chosen – specifically – to remain in urban areas.  The 
death of Matthew Shepard did not instantly affect me, as an 
openly gay man living in a mid-sized city who has never been 
beaten for identifying as gay.  Conversely, my mother lives in a 
rural town of around 13,000 people.  While visiting, I often go 
to a local supermarket.  Once while on my way into the store and 
once while exiting I was called “fag” by strangers, who then 
continued in the opposite direction. The utterance of that word 
caused me to quicken my pace to my vehicle, immediately aware of 
the fact that I was now in a rural setting – one very similar to 
Laramie, Wyoming.  I do not consider myself overly feminine in 
demeanor; I never uttered a word and yet was labeled, “Fag,” 
which – following the death of Matthew Shepard – I translated 
into “Fag: Okay to Attack.”  However, since those experiences, I 
have met more gay men that live in the small town.  My 
experience with these men who have made the choice of a rural 
life seems to indicate D’Emilio was correct:  as more gay men 
choose to live in rural areas, more gay men will see that choice 
as a valid and appropriate one for them. 
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 The media’s (including The Laramie Project) fascination 
with the Shepard incident revolved not only around the brutal 
nature of the crimes or Matthew Shepard’s image, but also around 
the shifting viewpoint in this communal narrative.  After 
Shepard’s death and with the increased visibility of rural gay 
people, the myth of the American West as a purely conservative 
place sans alternative sexualities was challenged.  Even the 
residents of Laramie seemed to work to reclassify its place in 
this narrative. As we have seen, the media descended on the town 
– characterizing it as the home of “rednecks” and “yahoos.”  
Even Doc O’Connor, the limo driver I quoted above, seems to 
recognize a place for “gay people in Wyoming.”  The detective of 
the Laramie police department whom Tectonic interviewed makes an 
even clearer point about his department’s response to Shepard’s 
death.  He called the coverage sensationalism, pointing out: 
“Wait a minute. We had the guys in jail in less than a day. I 
think that’s pretty damn good” (49).  The undercurrent, of 
course, is that the detective doubts that a metropolitan police 
department could have done any better.  Even in this 
representative of the mainstream, then, we see a desire to 
recognize gay people as equals under the law.  So, the political 
goal of visibility is having its intended effect – to create 
safe spaces for gay people anywhere in the country. 
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 The shifting American landscape evidenced by this 
detective’s desire to treat gay people equally, even in the 
West, created a kind of panicked response from proponents of the 
image of a morally pure rural America.  The most vehement 
contestations of this reinterpreted identity and of making 
Matthew Shepard into a symbol came from religious extremists, 
politically identified with the far right.  From this quarter, 
the gay community was roundly criticized for capitalizing on 
Shepard’s death. For instance, in a letter to The Baton Rouge 
Advocate Frank Black wrote that “Homosexual lobbyists have 
claimed that this act of violence can be attributed to recent 
newspaper ads that offer ministry to those who want to leave the 
homosexual lifestyle.  As a result, homosexuals will now feel 
free to blame Christianity any time a crime is committed against 
a homosexual” (10B).  Gay political activists did claim that a 
culture of violence has been created in part by the idea that 
God wants gay men to turn from sinful lifestyles.   
An editor for the Memphis Commercial Appeal wrote on this 
issue seemingly suggesting some middle ground between the 
positions of gay political activists and those on the religious 
right:  
It isn’t fair to say, as some militant commentators have 
suggested, that everyone who opposes homosexuality is 
complicit in Shepard’s death [ . . . ] Surely, though, the 
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most extreme expression of these attitudes do contribute to 
a climate of hate that may encourage such atrocities.  
Would you trust the spiritual guidance of the so-called 
minister whose followers showed up at Shepard’s funeral 
brandishing signs that read “God Hates Fags” and “AIDS 
cures fags”? (Kushma, Editorial page) 
Kushma is pointing to the cultural trend of violence against gay 
people (as evidenced by Phelps’ protests) and arguing that the 
virulent hate-mongering created a permissive environment for the 
murder of Shepard.  This editor clearly places Phelps at odds 
with those who simply oppose homosexuality.  Phelps is not, I 
think, indicative of those who identify with conservative 
religious principles.  Many, like Frank Black, are members of 
“Christian organizations that are being targeted abhor such 
violence.  Never have they condoned such activity, and they 
condemn it without qualification” (10B).   
Reverend Fred Phelps, long before Matthew Shepard’s death, 
made it his life’s work and the mission of his Westboro Baptist 
Church (in Topeka, KS) to fight against what he saw as a 
homosexual agenda.  Phelps worked, and continues to work, very 
diligently at making Matthew a surrogate for what he interprets 
as God’s hatred of gay men.  Phelps’ group even argued, post 9-
11, that America’s positive treatment of homosexual people 
brought divine retribution in the form of these terrorist acts 
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(Westboro Baptist Church).  His group protested at Shepard’s 
funeral, and Phelps’ words on that day found their way into The 
Laramie Project: 
But this murder is different, because the fags are bringing 
us out here trying to make Matthew Shepard into a poster 
boy for the gay lifestyle. And we’re going to answer it 
[ . . . ] God’s hatred is pure. It’s a determination that 
he’s going to send some people to hell [ . . . ] If God 
doesn’t hate fags, why does he put ‘em in hell? You see the 
barrenness and sterility of your silly arguments [ . . .] 
Barren and sterile. Like your lifestyle. Your silly 
arguments. (79) 
The virulent nature of Phelps’ words is clear; eternal judgment 
and damnation will fall upon gay people and the violent beating 
of Matthew Shepard is the mark of that judgment. 
 Shepard’s death and the events surrounding it became a 
cause for Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church.  The group has 
organized regular, ongoing pickets of various events.  From news 
releases which can be found on their website, I obtained the 
notices of two of their pickets.  The group picketed the City of 
Casper, Wyoming.  The news release reads, in part: 
WBC to picket the sodomite whorehouse masquerading as the 
City of Casper, Wyoming – in Celebration of the “5th 
Anniversary of Matt Shepard’s entry into Hell” – [ . . .] 
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in religious protest/warning: ‘God is not mocked!’ God 
Hates Fags! & Fag Enablers! (3 Oct. 2003, par. 1) 
The release goes on to blame Shepard for his own death:  
Matt Shepard is no hero. He’s an idiot. Trolling for fag 
sex in a cowboy bar at midnight is not the stuff of 
heroism. It’s the stuff of idiocy. (3 Oct. 2003, par. 2) 
It also criticizes Judy Shepard:   
Matt’s goofy mother now charges $5,000+ to spread the lie 
“It’s OK to be gay.” Having raised her own son for the 
devil and Hell, she now – for lucre, like the opportunistic 
pig she is – seeks to influence other people’s sons and 
daughters to doom. (3 Oct. 2003, par. 2) 
Also openly available on the website are photos of some of the 
group’s protests.  In one photo, group members are standing on 
the grave of an openly gay man who died in Hallsville, MO.  Some 
of their signs read, “No Fags in Heaven,” and “Gold [the man who 
died] in hell” (Friendship Church) – signs similar to those they 
carried at the Shepard funeral.4 
 The Laramie Project itself continues to be the subject of 
criticism by the far extreme religious right as personified in 
Phelps and his organization.  The play is now being produced by 
high schools across the country.  Every time Phelps’ group 
learns of such a production, they protest.  The church issued a 
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news release announcing its protest of the Las Vegas Academy 
production: 
WBC to picket the sodomite whorehouse masquerading as Las 
Vegas Academy and the Pied Piper from Hell Principal 
Stephen Clark [ . . . ] God hates Las Vegas Academy, the 
school board and all responsible for leading the kids to 
lives of sin, shame, misery, disease, death and Hell by 
inculcating in them the Satanic lie that It’s OK to be gay! 
They made impressionistic kids produce a cheap fag 
propaganda play – The Laramie Project.  (News Release 4 May 
2004, par. 1-2) 
Interestingly, the protest came after the close of the play at 
the high school, and there were no protests by local parents or 
other constituencies.  According to a television news story, 
less than twelve people protested (among them Phelps’ daughter) 
and more than 300 were at the school in counter protest (“The 
Laramie Project”). 
Phelps is an outrageous example and is not a representative 
one.  Other self-identified Christians expressed less judgmental 
understandings of Shepard’s death.  In face, some even compared 
Shepard’s role as surrogate to that of another surrogate who was 
murdered in the Columbine school shootings. In the latter case, 
a young woman became a symbol of Christian martyrdom (as many 
have accused gay politicos for making a martyr out of Matthew).  
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A young woman was supposedly asked by one of the shooters if she 
loved God.  After some hesitation, she replied “yes” and was 
immediately shot.  In a discussion list on the web, the 
following exchange took place: 
#1: This tragedy is absolutely disgusting. I for one place 
a certain amount of blame on the stupid gun laws in the 
USA, and on lack of education and compassion. 
#2: I agree. 
#1: It disgusts me to see religions taking advantage of 
this. 
#2: I think you will find that Christians will "take 
advantage" of this tragedy in just about exactly the same 
way that the gay lobby has "taken advantage" of the tragic 
death of Matthew Shepard. And for much the same reasons. 
(DejaNews Discussion List) 
The tenor of party #2’s response might be read as anti-gay.  
However, it is clear that the second party recognizes that those 
who have died in tragic circumstances often come to fill the 
role of surrogate – to stand-in as representative of a need for 
some kind of social change.  
Both political coalitions seem to be creating surrogates 
for representation within the public sphere (as speaker #2 
indicates), but the common ground between religious self-
identification and gay self-identification remains elusive.  In 
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short, if someone is murdered because of their religious self-
identification, the perpetrator can, under federal sentencing 
laws, be given a harsher sentence.  According to the Human 
Rights Campaign, “Current federal hate crime law, passed by 
Congress is 1968, allows federal investigation and prosecution 
of hate crimes based on race, religion, and national origin” 
(“Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act” par. 3).  Gay men are, 
then, asking for protections already provided ethnicities and 
religious people.  The political desire, then, is for equal 
protections – to be like other citizens of America. 
That Matthew Shepard should have come to serve as a 
surrogate was obviously problematic, in the least, to more 
conservative receivers of the media’s message.  Religious 
extremists were not the only conservatives who found problems 
with the surrogation.  For instance, in The Laramie Project, one 
very striking interview is conducted with the wife of a highway 
patrolman who expressed her dismay over Shepard’s death.  She 
clearly questions the value of Shepard as surrogate.  Upset by 
the fact that so much attention had been paid to Shepard’s death 
while very little attention was paid to the death of another 
highway patrolman, she remarks to the interviewer, “ [ . . . ] 
here’s one of ours, and it was just a little piece in the 
paper.”  She continues, “I don’t think [Matt Shepard] was that 
pure [ . . . ] He was, he was just a barfly, you know. And I 
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think he pushed himself around… Why they exemplified him I 
don’t’ know” (64). We are not, clearly, given any clues as to 
the speaker’s religious beliefs, but she calls Matthew’s purity 
into question, suggesting that he was not as exemplary as his 
role as surrogate might suggest.  However, she points to the 
cleansing of Matthew Shepard in preparation for his role as a 
national symbol for victims of hate crimes. 
Other examples from The Laramie Project point to the 
tendency of conservative thinkers to be against hate crimes 
legislation.  This same Laramie resident declares, “What’s the 
difference if you’re gay? A hate crime is a hate crime. If you 
murder somebody you hate ‘em. It has nothing to do with if 
you’re gay or a prostitute or whatever” (65).  The play also 
reports the political response of Wyoming’s governor.  When the 
governor’s position on hate crimes is questioned by a reporter, 
he retorts, “I would like to urge the people of Wyoming against 
overreacting in a way that gives one group ‘special rights over 
others’” (48). Indeed, the Wyoming Republican party maintains 
this exact position.  The Casper Star-Tribune reported on May 9, 
2004 that one plank of the state party platform was blocking 
hate crimes legislation from passage (par. 1).   
 The judgmental attitude of Fred Phelps towards gay people 
and even the responses from the Laramie resident and Wyoming’s 
(then-) Governor are indicative of the desire to reinterpret 
114 
Matthew Shepard’s status as a surrogate.  Following Shepard’s 
death, a symbolism had begun to surround him, symbolism that 
called for gay people to receive the same kinds of protection 
that other groups had already received.  However, these 
conservatives are pointing towards other parts of Shepard’s 
image that may serve to disqualify him (and by proxy, gay 
people) from what they term “special” protection.    
 
The Murder of Matthew Shepard: A Continuing Struggle over Image 
 The battle over the public memory of Matthew Shepard and 
his place as a surrogate for the political aim of the passage of 
hate crimes legislation resonates within the gay community even 
now.  As recently as August of 2004, the Matthew Shepard story 
had resonance within the gay community.  In an ad calling for 
“`tolerance’ from the GOP on gay issues,” the Log Cabin 
Republicans used the image of Phelps’ protest at Shepard’s 
funeral to encourage members of the Republican Party to avoid 
“the politics of intolerance and fear that lead only to hate” 
(Memmott, par. 9).  The resonance of Matthew Shepard’s image as 
a young, white, gay male in need of protection from hate-
motivated violence is clear.   
Interestingly, gay people seemed to accept and imitate the 
media’s image of Shepard as surrogate.  The community responded 
politically to Shepard’s death with street-theatre type activism 
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calling for the passage of hate crimes legislation and battering 
homophobic attitudes.  In its responses to the death and to the 
media’s portrayal of Shepard, the community also created its own 
surrogate and further questioned the use value of Shepard as a 
political symbol. 
The community’s reaction to Shepard’s death was widespread 
and immediate.  I find in the “political” funerals an attempt, 
not unlike the media’s to create meaning surrounding Shepard’s 
death.  This process of the creation of meaning is the process 
of surrogation.  “Peter,” an actor in New York, wrote on a Gay 
Theatre listserv:  
I have always felt a responsibility to support the gay 
community and last October with the killing of Matthew 
Shepard this feeling became intensified. I wanted to give 
my community all the support I could since those who oppose 
us do for their side, so much so that in the mind of two 
young men killing a queer was an act of pious 
righteousness. I also experienced the disrespect accorded 
our people when marching in Matthew’s memory we were 
taunted and cops stood ready to bash our heads in if we 
looked at them sideways. (Gay Theatre Listserv, 4/26/99) 
Peter is referencing the “political funeral” (Harris 63) in New 
York in which 200 people gathered outside the Plaza Hotel for 
what was initially planned as a candlelight vigil.  The group 
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eventually swelled above 5,000, and police intervened after the 
crowd blocked cars on the Avenue of the Americas.  The vigil 
became a political funeral because “some demonstrators carried a 
coffin to represent Shepard’s body, some had drums and whistles, 
others carried sings reading ‘Where is Your Rage’ and “Matthew 
Shepard – Killed by Homophobia’” (Harris 65).  Officers are said 
to have charged the crowd with horses.  With these reactions, we 
see the process of surrogation at work.  Shepard became more 
than the embodied individual bearing that name.  Instead, the 
name came to be synonymous with violence perpetrated against gay 
people.   
 The Laramie Project can be read, I think, as a gay response 
to Shepard’s death – as a way to ensure that Shepard’s death 
stands in for something.  Kaufman’s first play, Gross Indecency: 
The Three Trials of Oscar Wilde, dealt with England’s sodomy law 
and Wilde’s arrest and conviction under it.  Within the text of 
The Laramie Project we discover that two of the company members 
doing the interviews are gay. However, even though Kaufman seems 
to suggest that the play does not put forward a message 
(choosing only to examine the event and the results), I argue 
otherwise.  Ultimately, The Laramie Project does more than 
simply document the experience of the residents of Laramie and 
the other interviewees.  The play comes to serve as a political 
indictment of a culture that allowed this tragedy to occur. 
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Kaufman insists that his play is anti-realist, pointing out 
that “the theater has too often remained entrenched in the 
nineteenth-century traditions of realism and naturalism” (vi).  
Of course, Kaufman is discussing the realistic staging of plays 
evidenced in the late-nineteenth century theatre of America and 
Europe.  He quotes Brecht in an attempt, I think, to distance 
the work from the media’s “Aristotelian” packaging of the 
Matthew Shepard story – packaging which transforms the story 
into a kind of drama in which we expunge “the evil within” and 
restore “the social order” (Ott and Aoki 486).   
He argues directly against the use of traditional dramatic 
structure, preferring to present the story in moments: 
A moment does not mean a change of locale or an entrance or 
exit of actors or characters. It is simply a unit of 
theatrical time that is then juxtaposed with other units to 
convey meaning. (xiv)   
Kaufman’s use of moments creates meaning, since the authorial 
hand appears in the juxtaposition of the moments.  Overall, 
then, the process of creating these moments served as another 
kind of packaging, albeit one that served a different rhetorical 
purpose and was delivered to a different audience. 
Kaufman takes an empathetic position toward subjects 
identified with the position of the gay community.  For 
instance, within the text of the play, only one moment can be 
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interpreted as critical of the gay community’s response to the 
event.  Tectonic members interviewed the president of the 
University of Wyoming, Philip Dubois.  Dubois read them an e-
mail he received following the incident.  The e-mail writer also 
virulently attacks Dubois, likening him and the faculty of the 
University to the Third Reich.  The e-mail continues,  
You have taught your straight children to hate their gay 
and lesbian brothers and sisters. Unless and until you 
acknowledge that Matt Shepard’s beating is not just a 
random occurrence, not just the work of a couple of 
crazies, you have Matthew’s blood on your hands. (56) 
Dubois’ response was, “And uh, well, I just can’t begin to tell 
you what that does to you” (56).  Dubois obviously felt attacked 
unjustly.  This moment seems critical of the over-dramatic, 
virulent response of the e-mail writer. 
Kaufman’s attempt to distance his play from the politically 
and economically driven dramatization of the media reveals a 
specific rhetorical strategy.  The distancing maneuver fails.  
That the play serves to support the gay movement’s political 
goal of passage of hate crimes legislation cannot be denied.  
The movement uses Shepard as a surrogate for a political end.  
In the final moment of the play, Jonas Slonaker – a Laramie 
resident – notes,  
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Those two boys got what they deserve, and we look good now. 
Justice has been served [ . . .] we don’t need to talk 
about it anymore [ . . . ] it’s been a year [ . . . ] and 
they haven’t passed shit in Wyoming [ . . . ] nobody has 
passed anything anywhere.  (99) 
By this point, Slonaker has been identified as one of the openly 
gay characters in the piece.  That his statement was chosen as 
the final moment in the play indicates both Tectonic’s and 
similarly the gay movement’s desire to achieve that political 
goal, a desire heightened by Shepard’s death.  So, Kaufman and 
Tectonic created a piece of non-realistic theatre (if one 
defines non-realism as unconventional dramatic structure) in 
which they advance the surrogation of Matthew Shepard for a 
political aim. 
While the gay community has battled the extreme religious 
right over the public memory of Matthew Shepard, his surrogacy 
within the gay community is also a source of conflict.  The 
community struggles over whether or not Shepard should define 
the public image of gay men and challenges the erasures caused 
by the media and The Laramie Project.  For example, Dan Savage, 
in an opinion piece written for The Advocate in March of 1999 
(five months after the murder), discusses the sexual risks many 
gay men take and suggests that Shepard took similar risks.  He 
asserts, that Shepard’s actions on the night of his murder used 
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to be called ‘rough trade’ – the dangerous, centuries-old 
practice of gay men picking up grimy, testosterone packed 
straight or semi-straight toughs” (62).  We cannot possibly know 
Shepard’s motives when he left the bar that night, but he was 
certainly was committing to a dangerous situation.  By all 
accounts, Shepard was intelligent.  Savage argues he “assessed 
the risks and decided they were worth it” (62). If we are to 
believe the words of Aaron McKinney in his confession, then an 
assumption that Shepard was hoping for a sexual encounter with 
the two men is not invalid. However, the point of Savage’s 
argument is that Shepard’s sexuality – his sexual exploration – 
was very specifically excluded from the coverage of his death in 
the media.  For mainstream viewers, Shepard became a slaughtered 
lamb.  For Shepard to become a symbol, his martyrdom was 
necessary. 
In the debate over the appropriate public image for the 
mainstream, Savage seems to suggest that cleansing Shepard’s 
image was an error.  He asserts, “More disturbing [than this 
cleansing] is our inability to allow Matthew Shepard and other 
risk takers their desire without punishing them for it” (64).  
Savage states the very specific reason why “sex was erased from 
the Shepard story” (64).  He continues, 
One of the reasons Shepard’s murder received slaughtered 
lamb treatment from the mainstream media was because 
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everyone denied the murdered student his sexuality. Gay and 
lesbian activists declared his motives off-limits for a 
reason. Of the 20 or more gay men murdered every year in 
the United States in antigay attacks, most are victims of 
pickup crimes or violent bashings outside sex spaces or gay 
bars, and their faces don’t grace the cover of Time. (64) 
Savage implicates gay activists in Shepard’s cleansing and notes 
that cleansing was in the service of a political aim. 
Savage directly highlights, then, the tension in the gay 
community over the public imaging of Matthew Shepard.  I have 
found no direct evidence supporting his suggestion that the 
larger gay political movement whitewashed Shepard’s image.  In 
truth, the cleansing of Shepard’s image was executed by the 
media.  Rather than the whole of the movement, two gay men chose 
to direct the media’s attention to Shepard as a victim of a hate 
crime.  Irrespective of this contradiction, Savage’s point still 
stands.  Whether or not a murder happens as the result of a pick 
up (or when a man is outside a sex club or gay bar) is 
irrelevant.  The murder happened and occurred because of the 
perceived queerness (and possibly perceived homosexual activity) 
of the victim.   
Savage goes on to point out that “the culture — gay and 
straight — subconsciously believes that if a gay man, out 
looking for sex, gets killed, he has no one to blame but 
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himself” (64). In sum, Savage’s argument is that we must address 
societal attitudes towards sex.  Whether or not Shepard was or 
was not looking for sex is irrelevant.  The choice to ignore 
Shepard’s possible sexual activity further dehumanized Shepard.  
Societal attitudes towards gay men are not changed by ignoring 
the fact that they are men who have sex with other men.  
Ignoring this reality desexualizes and thus dehumanizes gay 
people.  Savage finally argues that gay political activists did 
a disservice to their cause by not making the case that 
Shepard’s sexual behavior was irrelevant.  Public performance of 
gay male identities, whether inclusive of a sexual component or 
not, should not subject gay people to violence. 
Another gay cultural critic, the conservative commentator 
Andrew Sullivan, bemoans the continued attention to Shepard.  He 
holds that Shepard’s surrogation is completed to the detriment 
of other murders of gay people.  Then editor of The New 
Republic, Sullivan wrote in 1999, “[ . . . ]the Shepard case is 
about political and cultural symbolism.”  Made into a martyr and 
stripped of “any maturity, any manhood, any adult sexuality” 
(6), Shepard’s image as representative actually has a negative 
effect on one aim of the gay political movement – the desire for 
the individual gay man or lesbian to “be left alone” or, in my 
reading of his work, to be able to be recognized as sexual, 
desiring people.   
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In this article, Sullivan opposes hate-crimes legislation, 
but his argument is poignant.  He recounts the murders of Billy 
Jack Gaither and Army Private Barry Winchell; his suggestion is 
that because these two were “men, not boys,” weren’t “upper-
middle-class [ . . . ] well-educated [ . . . ] waifs,” they do 
not support the cultural notion of what it is to be a male 
homosexual.  Shepard fit the stereotype and thus, according to 
Sullivan, can continue to serve the role of the martyr because 
he does not, like these men, “threaten the weak, effeminate 
stereotype” of gay men (6).  Shepard serves to maintain, then, a 
damaging stereotype of gay men; the battle over Shepard’s use as 
a surrogate is a battle over appropriate gay public imaging. 
In another, more chilling, indictment of national gay 
political organizations, Sullivan (in a 2001 article) decried 
the fact that these organizations ignored the murder of a young, 
possibly gay man by a “couple” in Arkansas.  The men violently 
raped and murdered the 13-year-old.  Directly mentioning the 
Human Rights Campaign, Sullivan suggests the political motives 
behind the symbolization of Matthew Shepard as he writes, 
[ . . . ] The Human Rights Campaign [ . . . ]has said 
nothing whatsoever about the Dirkhising case.  For the HRC 
[ . . . ] it is “off-message.” Worse, there’s a touch of 
embarrassment among some gays [ . . . ] as if the actions 
of this depraved couple had some connection to the rest of 
124 
gay America [ . . . ] by helping to hush this up, they seem 
to confirm homophobic suspicions that this murder actually 
is typical of gays. (8) 
Sullivan is participating in his own brand of rhetorical 
strategy here, but his point is valid.  By ensuring that Shepard 
continues to stand in for other gay men who have been murdered, 
political organizations may be aiding the continuation of 
grossly over-generalized gay stereotypes. 
Ultimately, Sullivan argues against any kind of enhanced 
hate crimes legislation thereby challenging the political 
structure of the gay counter-public.  The battle continues as 
one over public visibility and appropriate images and practices 
put forward for mainstream consumption.  Shepard serves as a 
symbol because he is now divorced from a sexualized gay male 
identity.  He serves as a symbol because he was white, middle-
class, effete, in ways that other victims of hate crimes have 
not been (homeless gay people, transvestites, men in the 
military – rough trade).  The process of surrogation, it seems, 
requires certain cultural proscriptions to be in place – before 
a ghost is allowed to cross the borders of cultural identity. 
Shepard crossed the borders of cultural identity into the 
mainstream’s public memory because, I think, of the initial 
whitewashing of his image – the refusal by mainstream media to 
focus on his sexuality and the immediate characterization of 
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Shepard as the victim of an anti-gay hate crime.  The media 
could not resist such a dramatic story during a “slow news 
week.”  Shepard’s whiteness and his status as a relatively 
effete male also aided his crossing.  Shepard was not 
threatening to the mainstream’s understanding of homosexual 
people because he was frail and thin and unable to protect 
himself.  Interestingly, the mainstream ignored the anti-gay 
prejudice of the religious right, and Shepard stands today as a 
surrogate for hate crime victims.  By and large, the gay 
political apparatus supports this surrogation.  Others, however, 
question the use value of Shepard in that role. 
 The battles over the body of Matthew Shepard and what role 
his death should serve in the larger spectrum of the gay 
political movement are not over.  By forcing Shepard into an 
angelic mold and stripping him of his sexuality, by pointing up 
his status as victim, the gay political apparatus – as evidenced 
by the actions of the Human Rights Campaign – may be damaging 
what might be characterized as one of the long term goals of the 
movement: the expansion of attitudes towards different 
sexualities of all kinds.  Clearly, Shepard, as a symbol, serves 
well in the role of surrogate – he does cross the borders of 
cultural identity; it’s easy for gay men to identify with him 
and it’s easy for many to feel the fear he must have felt while 
being tied to the fencepost and beaten.  What his status as a 
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surrogate means for the identities of gay men, however, remains 
unclear. 
 In this chapter, I have used the battles over Shepard’s 
image to underline the very unstable and ongoing process of 
surrogation.  For the gay political apparatus as a whole, 
Shepard came to stand in as a symbol for all of the gays who had 
been murdered because of their identity.  For other gay cultural 
critics, Shepard is emblematic of problems within the 
mainstream’s cultural construction of gay people as people 
seeking “special rights” because they are in need of protection.  
For radical right-wing conservatives, Shepard is emblematic of 
the danger homosexuals pose to the country at-large.  For the 
media, Shepard may have been, simply, the most dramatic story 
they could find in a “slow news week.”  The media’s construction 
of Shepard also represents, in part, the public imaging of gay 
identities that are tolerated within the mainstream.  For each 
of these groups, then, Shepard stands for something different – 
something determined from within the group itself and then 




1 The Laramie Project was written by the Tectonic Theatre 
Project, led by Moises Kaufman.  The play opened in Denver (only 
around two hours drive from Laramie, Wyoming where Shepard was 
killed), moved to New York, and then was performed in Laramie 




2 Legislation which affords federal judges and prosecutors the 
option of enhancing indictments or sentences when they find that 
a crime is motivated by hate of a religion, race, sex, or 
national origin currently exists. 
 
3 Mandziuk’s article recounts the process, in three cities, of 
the creation of public monuments to Sojourner Truth.  Her quotes 
around the word, “monument,” suggest to me, however, that public 
memory is about simplicity – and not complexity – in any 
creation of public memory.   
 
4 The religious leaders in Laramie, several of whom were 
interviewed for The Laramie Project, were not, generally, 
antagonistic and condemning.  The Baptist minister told a 
Tectonic member, “Now I think they [meaning Henderson and 
McKinney] deserve the death penalty,” and “I hope that Matthew 
Shepard as he was tied to that fence, that he had time to 
reflect on a moment when someone had spoken the word of the Lord 




THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE AND SODOMY LAW 
 
Eve Sedgwick, in her work Epistemology of the Closet, 
speaks to the cultural space in which the gay rights movement 
found itself in the late twentieth century.  The United State 
Supreme Court construed the act of coming out as private; then, 
the following year the same court construed the sexual activity 
of gay people as public – subject to governmental regulation. 
Sedgwick recounts the 1985 decision of the United States Supreme 
Court to “let stand” the decision of a lower court concerning a 
gay rights case; in this instance, a bisexual guidance counselor 
was fired for “coming out” before her colleagues.  The lower 
court found that the guidance counselor’s admission to her 
colleagues was not protected by the First Amendment because “the 
act of coming out . . . does not constitute speech on a matter 
‘of public concern’” (70).  In between these two decisions, 
queer identities straddled the public/private binary.  
The following summer, the Supreme Court ruled on the appeal 
of Bowers v. Hardwick, reversing a lower court’s ruling and 
upholding Georgia’s prohibition of sodomy:  
[ . . . ] the court ruled, in response to Michael 
Hardwick’s contention that it’s nobody’s business if he do, 
that it ain’t: if homosexuality is not, however densely 
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adjudicated, to be considered a matter of public concern, 
neither in the Supreme Court’s binding opinion does it 
subsist under the mantle of the private. (70) 
Hardwick had contended that he should be able to pursue sexual 
intimacy without interference; the Supreme Court, however, 
declared “it ain’t so.”  The sexual choices of gay people had 
been considered criminal activities for many years; the court 
affirmed the state’s right to interfere. 
 Such cases, concerning private choices about individual 
identities, highlight the dilemma posed to people in the United 
States.  In taking identities public, in working to shape and 
promote their own public images, gay people find even their 
right to participation questioned.  Even as we participate as 
citizens, we are aware that in private, the only sexual choices 
available to us are criminalized.  When one declares, “I am 
gay,” one declares one’s desire for others of the same sex (this 
desire is one of Butler’s significations attaching itself to the 
individual); in this declaration, then, the announcement is one 
of already criminalized sexual. 
The spectre of criminality, therefore, has haunted the 
boundaries of gay public identity performances.  In this 
chapter, I examine the gay rights movement’s goal of the 
decriminalization of sodomy.  I examine three cases related to 
sodomy laws to uncover the public images of gay people presented 
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both by gay advocates and by those opposing the 
decriminalization of sodomy laws.  The United States Supreme 
Court, in particular, is the ultimate site of identity creation 
and performance.  The court’s function of interpreting the laws 
written by the legislature makes the court the final arbiter of 
identity presentations in the public sphere.  In the act of 
decriminalizing sodomy, the Court initiated a new era for gay 
activists – one in which gay people would no longer be 
classified as criminals in order to deny them access to full 
citizenship.  In order to reach this goal, gay advocates 
performed gay “identities” before the Court, making the case 
that gay people had identities that went beyond the sexual act 
of sodomy – which, in the end, helped the court to apply privacy 
protections that other publics had achieved to the class of 
people who self-identify as homosexual. 
Sodomy laws paint broadly each and every gay or lesbian 
person with the brush of the criminal.  Therefore, overturning 
sodomy laws across the United States has been the primary goal 
of gay legal activism, at least since the Bowers ruling in 1986. 
In large part, these gay legal activists represent the broader 
political movement as well. This activism has most notably been 
pursued by one national organization – the Lambda Legal Defense 
and Education Fund.  Individual gay legal scholars like William 
N. Eskridge also aided the ultimate end of sodomy regulation 
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through their scholarship.  Eskridge was was quoted in the 
majority opinion in Lawrence and Garner v. Texas (2003), the 
case that effectively overturned all of the remaining sodomy 
laws in the United States. Significantly, gay men had to come 
out into the public sphere to argue for the same kinds of 
privacy rights that had been recognized by the court for other 
classes of people.  Moreover, the very act of having these cases 
heard by the court indicated a level of visibility for gay 
citizens; they were able to perform their own identities before 
the court rather than having those identities constructed for 
them by the will of the majority.  
 
Arguing for the Private in the Public Sphere: Politicizing Needs 
 In Habermas’s work, the public sphere is “a theatre in 
modern societies in which political participation is enacted 
through the medium of talk” (Fraser “Rethinking” 519). Nancy 
Fraser’s reference to theatre underscores the nature of the 
public sphere as a gathering place of the public.  In the 
Habermasian sense, people gather in the theatre of the public 
sphere and discuss the political issues of the day.  In a space 
in which everyone is equal, proponents of various positions 
debate the issues.  The most persuasive argument succeeds; 
civilized, bourgeois society works through problems in this 
manner, ultimately allowing for the best results. 
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 Fraser seeks, however, to complicate the Habermasian 
conception.  Specifically, she recognizes various sites within 
the public sphere in which differences between unequal discourse 
groups are resolved. These other sites are sites where subaltern 
counter-publics can achieve recognition of their needs.  I call 
these sites “other” for a couple of reasons: 1) these sites are 
not part of the gathering place about which Habermas wrote, and 
2) there is an emancipatory potential residing within the 
functioning of these sites (like the courts, for instance).  
Fraser writes: 
[ . . . ] when social movements succeed in politicizing 
previously depoliticized needs, they enter the terrain of 
the social, where two other kinds of struggles await them.  
First they have to contest powerful organized interests 
bent on shaping need interpretations to their own ends.  
Second, they encounter expert needs discourses in and 
around the social state.  These encounters define two 
additional axes of needs struggle in late capitalist 
societies.  They are highly complex struggles, since social 
movements typically seek state provision of their runaway 
needs even while they tend to oppose administrative and 
therapeutic need interpretations.  Thus, these axes, too, 
involve conflicts among rival interpretations of social 
identity.  (Unruly 175) 
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Imagine, for a moment, gay people prior to the beginning of the 
gay rights movement.  Generally, gay people kept their 
identities secret.  Any needs that a gay person might have had 
were depoliticized in that case because those needs were outside 
of the terrain of the social, excluded from the process of 
discourse.  In politicizing their needs (the need for freedom 
from discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual 
identity, for instance), the subaltern counter-public is looking 
to the state to ensure the provision of those needs (a law 
banning employment discrimination).   
Fraser’s model indicates the way in which minority groups’ 
rights are advanced through action in the public sphere. I read 
Fraser’s runaway/politicized needs as rights that are opposed by 
the will of the majority.  For instance, in one of the first 
cases related to the civil rights movement, the Supreme Court 
desegregated schools, forcing states to create equal educational 
opportunities.  The “powerful organized interests” to which 
Fraser refers are those that desire to maintain a system, where 
the needs of a minority social group were not politicized and 
not part of the public discussion. By going public, by 
politicizing needs subaltern groups make social advancement.  In 
short, these groups must force recognition by the public at-
large.  For gay political activism, this has meant “coming out,” 
or taking what had been construed as private identities into the 
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public sphere.  In working towards recognition, gay politics has 
also learned how to manipulate public imaging of gay identities 
and worked to obtain provision of its rights-needs within the 
courts. 
Generally, in politicizing needs, a subaltern group not 
only seeks recognition of that need but usually some state 
intervention for the provision of that need.  According to 
Fraser’s model, judicial, administrative, and therapeutic 
interpretations of those needs must be made before state 
intervention (providing for the need) can occur.  These expert 
interpretations come from “legal discourses generated in 
judicial institutions and their satellite schools, journals, and 
professional associations; administrative discourses circulated 
in various agencies of the social state; and therapeutic 
discourses circulated in public and private medical and social 
service agencies” (173-4).  Fraser warns that these discourses 
have a tendency to depoliticize needs, moving them again out of 
the realm of public discussion.  The charge for subaltern groups 
is to continually monitor the public images available for 
interpretation within these expert discourses and to work 
towards interpretations that aid the advancement of their 
political goals. 
Fraser’s model can be seen as emblematic of the larger 
movement towards recognition of the rights of gay citizens.  At 
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times throughout it history, the gay rights movement has been at 
odds with administrative and therapeutic expert discourses.  For 
instance, the classification of homosexuality as a mental 
illness by psychological and psychiatric associations was a 
cause of concern (Marcus 173). The rights movement is no longer 
at odds with therapeutic discourse, because that discourse was 
changed in 1973 as a result, in part, of the movement’s 
activism.  Eric Marcus writes: 
[ . . . ] after many years of discussion and internal 
debate – and three years of protests and pressure from gay 
activists – the American Psychiatric Association’s Board of 
Trustees voted to remove homosexuality as a mental disorder 
from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders.  Gay men and women no longer had to live with 
the burden of the abhorrent official “sickness” label.  
(173) 
Marcus dramatically underscores the interplay between gay public 
images and identity.  This agency, an administrative and 
therapeutic one, classified gay men as mentally diseased; the 
removal of that burden was one step towards full citizenship.  
Having entered the public sphere, thus politicizing its rights-
needs, the gay community has worked for positive administrative 
and judicial interpretation of those needs – and for 
intervention when required.   
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Full citizenship includes, according to gay rights 
activists, public recognition of same-sex relationships in the 
form of state-sanctioned marriages, the ability to pursue 
intimate sexual association with members of the same sex without 
fear of prosecution, and protection from discrimination on the 
job.  The regulation of sodomy prohibits these goals from being 
achieved.  Sodomy laws permit those wishing to discriminate 
against gays people because they can argue that, rather than 
discriminating against a class of people, they are simply 
“regulating [ . . . ] conduct”  (Eskridge 172). 
For the most part, current gay activists have chosen to 
pursue re-interpretation of their socialized needs in the 
judicial arena.  Besides asking the courts to revoke sodomy 
statutes, gays are asking for the provision of job protection, 
adoption rights, and marriage rights.  Fraser did not, of 
course, imply that the judicial interpreters of needs would 
actually provide those needs.  However, because of the 
constitution’s guarantee of certain rights, judicial 
interpreters can indeed find themselves providing for the needs 
of social groups.   
Gay people enter the “theatre” of the court and perform 
their identities on its stage, both to be recognized and to 
obtain the goal of re-interpretation of their politicized needs.  
In large part, the court has become a site for the recognition 
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of minority groups and the expansions of their civil rights.  
More than that, the court is a site where public images of (in 
this case) gay people are performed by advocates for a 
particular need (right) before arbiters who ultimately have the 
power to provide (or not) recognition and advancement of the gay 
political agenda. 
 
Historical, Sited Court Decisions: The Rule of Law 
 Two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
expose the advancement of gay identity and political goals in 
the late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Clearly, 
the Supreme Court’s pronouncements have the effect of providing 
a snapshot of the society for which they are written.  In the 
case of the protections of privacy that the Court has provided 
(a politicized need), the Court created a zone of protection 
from governmental interference.  The Court has ordered, time and 
again, that the government cannot interfere in or regulate the 
private space in which an individual is said to form his or her 
identity through decisions relating to their experiences in the 
private sphere.  Interestingly, following years of performance 
of sexualized identities in the public sphere, the Court came to 
recognize those identities as the core of individual gay lives. 
 In the recent contention over gay marriage, President 
George W. Bush proposed a constitutional amendment that would 
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ban it.  He asserted that “activist” judges would invalidate 
state and federal laws which have defined marriage as a 
relationship that can exist only between a man and a woman.  The 
President seems to suggest that laws – written by the 
legislature – are not final.  In the Supreme Court’s cases 
related to privacy (in which abortion rights advocates and gay 
legal advocates obtained judicial interpretation of their 
needs), arguments have been made before the court that the 
legislature functions by the rule of the majority (which should 
be akin to the rule of law).  The legislature operating as the 
voice of the majority determines what rights are available to 
all citizens.  The Court has ruled this argument invalid.  The 
rule of law is not so stable, then, as it is popularly imagined. 
In his article, “`Masculinity,’ ‘The Rule of Law,’ and 
Other Legal Fictions,” Kendall Thomas characterizes the cultural 
perception of the rule of law as static and masculinist – like 
the law of the Father, in Lacanian terms.  He writes, “the law 
would have us believe [lawlessness] is its enemy and determinate 
negation” (223).  Quite the opposite is true.  According to 
Thomas, the “rule of law” incorporates lawlessness into itself. 
Jacques Lacan asserts:   
The Father must be the author of the law, yet he cannot 
vouch for it anymore than anyone else can, because he, too, 
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must submit to the bar, which makes him, insofar as he is 
the real father, a castrated father (qtd. in Thomas 235).   
In this reading, the father cannot himself be sure of the 
stability of the law.  That, for Lacan and for Thomas, is 
because the law uses language, the symbolic, and always already 
within the law is the language that can be used to overturn the 
law; Thomas asserts, “there is an undecidability which inhabits 
the very house of the rule of law" (232).  That undecidability 
is a lawlessness that threatens the rule of law, a lawlessness 
that precedes and becomes a part of that law.  That 
undecidability is the very language on which the law is based.  
That undecidability is what allows justice for subaltern counter 
publics. 
 In layman’s terms, if the laws written by the legislatures 
were not subject to judicial interpretation, there would be no 
final arbiter through which minority groups could seek judicial 
intervention which most often comes in the form of protection of 
minority groups’ rights.  In a space which comes very close to 
Habermas’s initial formulation of the public sphere (at least in 
spirit) minority groups can argue their case before judges in 
the hopes of overturning the will of the majority, which is most 
often designed to empower the majority while disenfranchising 
minority groups.  The courtroom is similar to the Habermasian 
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conception of the public sphere because it is, presumably, a 
space in which all parties begin as equal.   
 A very specific court doctrine – stare decisis, which is 
unique to the American justice system (Squires) – allows 
judicial bodies to interpret laws for the benefit of minority 
groups (and thus, gay citizens).  The doctrine requires judges 
to support their opinions through citing precedents, a practice 
that seemingly renders the court’s opinions more stable. 
However, because the law is based in language, the precedents 
used by those arguing before the Supreme Court can have multiple 
interpretations; the Justices choose one of those 
interpretations (or their own) in the creation of their 
opinions.  It is through these interpretations of precedent that 
the most important advances in privacy (and other) protections 
have been made in the last half century or so. 
The Court, then, becomes a site where various constructions 
of gay identities are discussed and debated.  Historically, the 
two cases that I will examine in this chapter came 17 years 
apart and represent very different eras of the gay rights 
movement. The mid-1980s, for instance, was an uncertain time in 
the movement for gay rights, as the community was struggling to 
deal with the AIDS crisis, and conversely, the 2003 sodomy 
decision followed a period of relative advancement in the public 
imaging of gay people (in the late 1990s).  One might speculate 
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whether or not the Court simply waited until its decision might 
prove more popularly palatable or until society as a whole was 
more tolerant.  So, rather than decriminalizing sodomy in 1986, 
the Justices waited until the gay movement had succeeded in 
politicizing its needs through the promotion of gay people as 
deserving of equal protections.  Whatever the case, the Court is 
a site of identity formation and public imaging of gay people, 
where public images and identities do battle, are promoted, and 
perhaps legitimized.  At the site of the Court, then, gay people 
advocate for greater visibility and work towards the goal of 
full citizenship through equal rights. 
In this process of achieving rights, a subaltern counter-
public politicizes its needs.  Then, it seeks Court intervention 
for the recognition of those needs (the assumption being that 
the majority does not recognize those needs).  In order for the 
Supreme Court to act, a majority of the justices must believe 
that the law being challenged threatens a fundamental right or 
that it discriminates against a suspect class of people.  If 
that determination is made in the affirmative, the strict 
scrutiny standard of review is applied.  Under this standard of 
review, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest in 
threatening that right.  If there is a compelling state 
interest, the law must be written in the least-restrictive means 
possible.  For instance, in a case of violation of the right to 
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privacy, the state must demonstrate that it has a compelling 
reason to violate the privacy of the individual and that its 
means of violating that privacy are the least-restrictive means 
possible.  The strict scrutiny standard is the most stringent 
standard of review (Squires).  In these cases, gay legal 
advocates claimed the right of intimate association (performed 
the humanity of gay individuals, if you will), but were 
unsuccessful until after a decision in which the Court 
recognized gay people as a class of individuals deserving of 
protection. 
 The standard of review most deferential to any argument the 
state offers for the constitutionality of a law is the rational 
basis standard.  The court applies this standard when it 
determines that no fundamental right is being violated.  When 
this standard is applied, the state’s law must only be 
rationally related to the ends it achieves.  A state could, for 
instance, argue that it is protecting the public health by 
enforcing sodomy laws (in the hope of stopping the spread of 
AIDS).  When the rational basis standard is applied, almost any 
law can be interpreted as constitutional.  So, in these two 
cases, the gay community worked to characterize sodomy laws as 
infringements upon the zone of privacy in which gay people 
should be able to pursue sexual intimacy free from governmental 
intrusion.  The basic goal was to characterize sexual intimacy 
 143
as a personal choice, one central to the formation of identity 
(Squires).  
 
Bowers v. Hardwick: Fundamental Homosexual Sodomy 
Michael Hardwick was in his bedroom in Atlanta, Georgia, 
enjoying sexual intimacy with his then-boyfriend when a police 
officer entered his room and placed him under arrest.  Hardwick 
knew the officer.  Several weeks before, the officer issued 
Hardwick a citation for drinking in public, in front of a gay 
bar where Hardwick worked.  In good faith, Hardwick went to the 
courthouse, paid for the citation, and thought his obligations 
were fulfilled.  When the officer arrested Hardwick, he informed 
Hardwick that there was an outstanding warrant related to the 
citation for drinking in public.   
Despite Hardwick’s protests that no warrant could have been 
issued, since the fines had been paid, the officer arrested him.  
The arrest was upheld because the officer entered Hardwick’s 
bedroom “on good faith.”  Hardwick, represented in court by the 
American Civil Liberties Union, appealed the Georgia sodomy law, 
which criminalizes anal or oral sex between same-sex or 
opposite-sex partners.   
Significantly, Hardwick was not initially inclined to 
appeal the law, rather “[ . . .] an ACLU attorney eager to 
challenge Georgia’s sodomy law contacted” him (Murdoch and Price 
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279).1   The Court agreed to hear the case.  Michael Hobbs, the 
Senior Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, opened his 
argument with his definition of the central question of the 
case: “whether or not there is a fundamental right under the 
Constitution of the United States to engage in consensual 
private homosexual sodomy” (Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 
oral argument emphasis added).  He went on to argue that no such 
right existed and that Georgia should not be required to show a 
compelling interest in prohibition of sodomy.  He suggested the 
court should look to history to determine whether or not such 
rights were fundamental.  He called on majoritarian morality as 
justification for sodomy laws and argues against revising the 
definition of family to include the families of gay people.  He 
specifically argued that the privacy protections the Court 
established in prior decisions only extend to decisions about 
marriage, family, procreation, and living with a relative.  He 
also quite specifically used a slippery slope argument, 
suggesting that a decision overturning the sodomy law would 
undermine “the legitimacy of statutes which prohibit polygamy, 
. . . same-sex marriage, . . . prostitution, fornication, 
adultery” (Bowers oral argument).  Obviously, Hobbs is 
attempting to perform a gay identity that metaphorically links 
queerness to other sexual crimes.  He moved, in effect, to make 
the case about sex and not about people’s choices. 
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 Laurence Tribe, who would later represent Al Gore in Bush 
v. Gore before the Court, argued, conversely, that the proper 
question to be considered was the limits of governmental power.  
He continued:  
The power invoked here, and I think we must be clear about 
it, is the power to dictate in the most intimate and, 
indeed, I must say, embarrassing detail, how every adult, 
married or unmarried, in every bedroom in Georgia will 
behave in the closest and most intimate association with 
another adult. (Bowers oral argument). 
Most likely because the Georgia law criminalized sodomy between 
same-sex and different-sex adults, Tribe did not argue, at least 
initially, a specifically gay identity.   
 Tribe argued against the use of majoritarian morality as 
support for the law and for a standard of review somewhere 
between strict scrutiny and rational basis – heightened 
scrutiny. Justice William Rehnquist pointed out that it would 
perhaps be best for the Court to wait until the public’s 
disposition toward sodomy laws was “reflected in the majority 
rule where . . . states have repealed these statutes” (Bowers 
oral argument).  Tribe instantly argued that the Court had never 
avoided providing “judicial protection” just because “persons 
might be able to obtain political redress” (Bowers oral 
argument).   
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 Tribe’s final argument was that Georgia refused to provide, 
any reason other than morality why the law should stand.  He 
dismissed arguments that the statute was not being enforced by 
arguing that Hardwick’s arrest and potential prosecution was 
sufficient to indicate the state’s “undisputed resolve to 
enforce the law.”  In response to a question about communicable 
disease, Tribe referenced a brief from the American Public 
Health Association which suggested sodomy laws would be 
counterproductive to such an aim.  He ended by a return to his 
point about limiting government to the public sphere – outside 
the bedroom.  In truth, Tribe was not arguing for a particular 
gay identity at all; rather, he was arguing the proper limits of 
the state’s power. 
In the majority opinion that overturned the Court of 
Appeals’ ruling that the Georgia sodomy law was indeed 
unconstitutional, Justice Byron White wrote of the majority’s 
[ . . . ]disagreement with the Court of Appeals and with 
respondent that the Court's prior cases have construed the 
Constitution to confer a right of privacy that extends to 
homosexual sodomy and for all intents and purposes have 
decided this case. (Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186) 
Quite obviously, the argument that held the most sway, at least 
when reading the opinion, was the Georgia argument that this 
case was about a right to participate in homosexual sodomy 
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versus the right to private intimate associations. 
Significantly, White never references homosexual men as men who 
are members of a particular class; references were always to 
homosexuals or homosexual sodomy, perhaps indicating the 
majority of justices refused to treat gays as a minority group 
deserving of the Court’s protections.  In other words, White 
denies the very existence of gay identities. 
In the dissent, Justice Blackmun argued against White’s 
specificity.  In Roe V. Wade and Griswold V. Connecticut, 
according to Blackmun, the court was protecting the right to 
make personal decisions about family and intimate association 
with others:   
We protect those rights not because they contribute, in 
some direct and material way, to the general public 
welfare, but because they form so central a part of an 
individual's life. (Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186) 
Moreover, according to Blackmun,  
the court [has, in previous cases,] recognized [ . . . ] 
that the ability independently to define one's identity 
that is central to any concept of liberty cannot truly be 
exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the “emotional 
enrichment from close ties with others.” (Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186)   
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Intimate association with others should be protected, according 
to Blackmun, from governmental interference.  Blackmun, as 
opposed to White, was clearly humanizing the “homosexual,” 
believing that homosexual people should receive the privacy 
protections of the Court.  Neither did Blackmun, however, 
reference a class of persons called gays; he instead references 
individuals’ rights. 
Thus, gay people in 1986 were not considered persons 
deserving of the protections provided other classes of people. A 
specifically gay/lesbian identity was not directly recognized by 
the court in its opinion.  Instead, a kind of “anti-identity” 
was proposed by the court: gay sexual intimacy does not lead to 
“family relationships” and “the fact that homosexual conduct 
occurs in the privacy of the home does not affect the result.” 
(Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186) 
In this case, gays were construed simply as representatives 
of their sexual acts; intimate associations of gay people were 
not deserving of privacy protections.  So, at this major site, 
the image of the sexually charged homosexual (defined only by 
his sexual acts) gained prominence. The decision in Bowers was 
seen as a damaging blow to the work of gay legal advocacy.  It 
prompted an almost immediate change in strategy from attempting 
to have these cases heard in the U.S. Supreme Court to working 
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in state courts, where state constitutions more directly 
indicated a specific right to privacy (Eskridge 168).   
 As this change in strategy suggests, the decision became 
the subject of scholarly discussion almost instantaneously 
(Sedgwick’s book was published just four years later).  Gay 
legal scholars also examined the decision.  In his book, Gaylaw: 
Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet, William Eskridge 
suggests that the Court’s decision was greatly influenced by the 
homophobia of three of the elder Justices – Byron White, Warren 
Burger, and Lewis Powell.  Homophobia is, of course, a fear of 
homosexuals as a group.  More than that, though, this particular 
fear was directed at the specter of homosexual sex.  
Steeped in secrecy, the Supreme Court’s deliberations are 
confidential and done in private.  The reasoning behind the 
decisions often remains unknown until the death of the Justice 
or until a clerk involved in a decision leaves a Justice’s 
employment.  Justice Lewis Powell left the court in 1987, and he 
publicly proclaimed that the Bowers decision was the one “he 
most regretted” (Eskridge 150).  Powell’s decision was, by two 
accounts, changed as a result of “hysterical lobbying” by the 
Chief Justice Warren Burger.   
 Interestingly, although Powell saw homosexuals as a group 
of people, he saw the group as one to be feared.  Eskridge 
uncovered evidence that Powell 
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considered same-sex intimacy repulsive and was wary that 
any constitutional protection for ‘homosexual sodomy’ would 
empower homosexuals to seek other rights. (166) 
Powell absolved his conscience through reliance on the fact that 
Hardwick had not been prosecuted.  Eskridge reports: 
It was comforting to Powell that the state could send a 
symbolic antigay message without sending Hardwick to 
prison.  This would have been a humane policy in the 1950s, 
but not after Stonewall and Eisenstadt.  The Supreme 
Court’s privacy jurisprudence assures all of us of sexual 
breathing room – to be disgusting in our bedroom without 
being penalized for it in the courtroom.  Hardwick denied 
that dignity to lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men.  This 
discrimination is defensible only if its objects are 
closeted. (167) 
Eskridge makes a very valid point.  Gay people who are closeted 
have made the decision not to publicly declare their identities. 
The anti-gay decision of the Supreme Court justices would have 
little effect on them.  By sending a “symbolic antigay message,” 
however, Justice Powell legitimated the homophobic attitudes of 
the mainstream culture. Made public by its criminalization, the 
sexual choice of sodomy (the only choice available to gays) 
created a kind of hyper-panic in the Justices of the Supreme 
Court.  They rushed to rethink their privacy jurisprudence in a 
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way that limited the right of gay people to pursue their sexual 
choices free from governmental intrusion.  After this decision, 
the mainstream could still use the image of the gay man as 
criminal to discriminate against him or her.  Gay men’s public 
performances of identities were always already questionable. 
 In my research on this decision, I uncovered an exemplary 
case of a single individual who straddled the divide between the 
public and private in the performance of his identity for others 
– a closeted clerk for Justice Powell. One of the most 
interesting speculations in Sedgwick’s work on the Bowers 
decision was that of the closeted clerk: 
The question kept coming up, in different tones, of what it 
could have felt like to be a closeted gay court assistant, 
or clerk, or justice, who might have had some degree, even 
a very high one, of instrumentality in conceiving or 
formulating or “refining” or logistically facilitating this 
ruling, these ignominious majority opinions, the assaultive 
sentences in which they are framed. (74-5) 
In Courting Justice: Gay Men and Lesbians vs. the Supreme Court, 
journalists Joyce Murdoch and Deb Price delineated the process 
by which Powell made his decision.  In interviewing Powell’s 
clerks, they met the young man who fits Sedgwick’s speculation. 
 The clerk’s name was Cabell Chinnis, and he lived with a 
partner while he clerked for Justice Powell.  Chinnis was 
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certain, prior to Burger’s panicked lobbying, that Powell would 
have voted to overturn the law.  He told Murdoch and Price: 
I was prepared to take the most aggressive measures that I 
could have taken, including, to put it colloquially, 
pleading on bended knee on the floor.  I was prepared to 
say, “You’re hurting me personally. You’re hurting people I 
care about. You need to understand there’s a human face to 
all of this.” I doubt that would have had any effect. He 
was just not swayed in his job by emotional appeals.  But I 
don’t care. Because if I had known that he was on the fence 
[ . . . ] (306) 
Chinnis had, perhaps, determined that his sexuality was not, 
prior to this decision, pertinent to his employ as a clerk.  
Significantly, Chinnis’s confession to Murdoch and Price 
suggests the level to which gay people will secret their 
identities, only to be revealed at a time of crisis – when the 
effect of the crisis would cause harm to the individual.  The 
decision to “take it public” or to “keep it private” continues 
to affect the gay individual – and by extension, the community 
as a whole.  As one individual makes the decision to keep their 
identity private, fewer people within the mainstream are exposed 
to gay images.  To call on John D’Emilio, fewer spaces are 
created for the exploration of gay identities. 
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 Relatively, the ways in which sodomy laws operated in 
Tennessee delineated a class of people and marked them as 
criminals.  Eskridge makes this function of the law clear; 
“Criminal laws operate both negatively and positively.  They act 
negatively by stigmatizing certain conduct; they act positively 
by normalizing the conduct prohibited” (161).  The available 
mainstream image of the gay person as a criminal actor 
stigmatized gay citizens across the country.  The Justices of 
the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized the stigmatization. 
In Campbell v. Sundquist, the plaintiffs admitted they 
violated Tennessee’s Homosexual Practices Act and declared they 
would continue to do so.  In other words, these plaintiffs, in 
effect, came out – as criminals in a very public site, the 
court. In doing so, these gay people made public their 
stigmatization by the workings of the legislature.  After 
Bowers, every gay person who came out was identified not only as 
homosexual, but also as a criminal.  Murdoch and Price make 
clear the equation: Sodomy = homosexuality / homosexuality = 
criminality (334).  
The responses of the “appellees” (who I referenced above 
referred to as the plaintiffs) to the state’s arguments expose 
the strategies of gay legal advocates.  As in Bowers, the 
American Public Health Association submitted a brief that 
forwards “a compelling argument that the statute is actually 
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counterproductive to public health goals” (Campbell v. 
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250).  The appellees also introduced 
evidence to suggest that people did not seek medical treatment 
and/or did not obtain testing for sexually transmitted diseases 
due to fear of exposure as a criminal under the statute.  Here 
is the first, I think, direct evidence of a clear danger to the 
individual as a result of an anti-gay law.  This danger applies, 
across the board, to anyone affected by the law.  Every gay or 
lesbian individual would, presumably, think twice about self-
reporting a disease if it meant that they would be arrested.  
The law, thus, functions to inhibit public identity performances 
– keeping them outside of the realm of the public sphere and 
away from the place where they might seek appropriate redress.  
The decision by the Tennessee Apellate Court, in effect, 
overturned Tennesee’s sodomy law; the Tennessee Supreme Court 
refused to hear the case. 
 
Lawrence and Garner v. Texas: A Protected Class 
In the Texas case, gay legal advocates were able to 
successfully perform the identities of gay people.  This case 
turned on the recognition of gay people as a class of 
individuals who were responsible for the formation of their 
identities. The facts of this case are strikingly similar to 
those in Bowers.  A “reported weapons disturbance” brought 
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Harris County (Houston) police officers to the apartment of John 
Lawrence; they entered and found Lawrence engaged in a sexual 
act with Garner.  Both were arrested, “held in custody over 
night and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace” 
(Lawrence and Garner v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558).  The Texas law is 
specific to homosexual sex.  It reads, 
A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual 
intercourse with another individual of the same sex.  The 
statue defined “deviate sexual intercourse” as follows: (A) 
any contact between any part of the genitals of one person 
and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the 
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person 
with an object. (Lawrence decision) 
The majority of the Supreme Court decided that the law should be 
overturned, ruling against the appeals court.  Interestingly, 
one justice determined that the law should be overturned on the 
grounds of violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
equal protection versus the “interests of liberty and privacy 
protected by the Due Process Clause” of the same amendment 
(Lawrence decision).  The Justices followed one of their more 
recent decisions about a case involving gays and suggested with 
this decision that gay people do constitute a minority group and 
that this group needed the intervention of the Court to ensure 
they received equal rights. 
 156
 Gay legal advocates had worked to overturn state sodomy 
statutes throughout the country for years prior to this case. 
They had tested arguments. Paul Smith’s opening statement (a 
lawyer for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund) positioned 
the Texas law as one which uses majoritarian morality as its 
only support and, significantly, as one that “is directed not 
just at conduct but at a particular group of people,” arguing 
that the law violates  
[ . . . ] the fundamental right [ . . . ] of all adult 
couples, whether same-sex or not, to be free from 
unwarranted state intrusion into their personal decisions 
about their preferred forms of sexual expression. (Lawrence 
oral arguments)    
He also argues that the state cannot justify the law’s 
application solely to same-sex couples.  Comparatively, Smith 
defined the issue immediately as being about privacy issues, 
whereas Laurence Tribe argued a more general principle of 
limited government.  In terms of gay people’s public image and 
advocacy strategies, the prior decision indicating protected 
class status caused a change. 
He suggests that the court’s past decisions look “at the 
function that a particular claimed freedom plays in the lives of 
real people” and clearly stakes out a “realm of personal 
liberty” in which individuals are free to construct their own 
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identities.  Further, he argues, “[the state’s] mere 
disapproval, however historically based” is not a sufficient 
basis for the law.  We see this change in direction most clearly 
here.  Having read the legal scholars, Smith chose to construct 
the issue for the court as one about identities and the part the 
sexual choice plays in the formation of those identities. 
 Interestingly, Smith also points to the nature of the Court 
as a barometer of public opinion.  He suggests to the Court that 
it should reconsider Bowers, because while Bowers has been on 
the books, the mood of the American public has changed to the 
point where the right to one’s own choice of intimate 
associations is “taken for granted for everyone” (Lawrence 
decision). 
 Oddly, the attorney who argued the case for Harris County, 
Texas suggested the two gentlemen involved in the case might not 
be homosexuals.  “They’re not homosexuals if they commit one 
act.”  He makes this point to suggest that a self-identified 
heterosexual could be charged under this law if he or she were 
caught in an “act of deviate sexual intercourse with another of 
the same sex.”  He further suggests that the class of people 
affected by the law is only “people who violate the act, not 
classes of individuals based on sexual orientation” (Lawrence 
oral arguments).  The hope, of course, was that he could 
redefine the issue for the court in such a way that the Justices 
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would not have to use the precedent they set in the prior 
decision to overturn the law. 
In its Lawrence decision, the five justices who determined 
that the case should be decided on the grounds that the law 
violates the Due Process Clause laid out the history of the 
privacy cases that came before.  In its earliest cases, the 
court protected the spatial freedom offered by “the marital 
bedroom” (i.e.: the marital relationship).  In Roe v. Wade, the 
famous case which made anti-abortion laws illegal, “The Court 
cited cases that protect spatial freedom and cases that go well 
beyond it” (Lawrence). 
The most significant argument the justices make in their 
opinion though is their recognition of the effects of sodomy 
laws on the lives of individuals.  In a response to the Bowers 
court’s argument that the case was about the protection of 
homosexual sodomy, the justices in this case argued that such a 
position demeans the individual.  They write, that although 
these statutes “purport to do no more than prohibit a sexual act  
[ . . . ] Their penalties and purposes have more far-reaching 
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, 
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home” 
(Lawrence).  The court makes a very key point – that law has the 
power to classify individuals as criminals which has effects on 
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the functioning of their daily lives as citizens in this 
country. 
The justices enumerated the kinds of consequences that gay 
people charged and convicted under such laws might face.  “The 
stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial,” 
they write.  Among the consequences the justices enumerate are 
the criminal record even a misdemeanor conviction produces – a 
record that attaches to the citizen; the labeling of the one 
convicted as a sex offender, requiring registration as such in 
at least four states; and, what they term “collateral” 
consequences, including notations on job applications.  In its 
very strongly worded conclusion to the opinion, the majority of 
the court wrote: 
The State cannot demean [the petitioners’] existence or 
control their destiny by making their private sexual 
conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their 
conduct without the intervention of the government. It is a 
promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of 
personal liberty which the government may not enter. 
(Lawrence) 
Despite arguments to the contrary by the dissenting justices, 
the Court voted six to three to reverse the Court of Appeals and 
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overturn the Texas law, effectively making unconstitutional the 
remaining sodomy laws in the United States. 
 For gay people, the Court created a space in which it 
became possible to declare oneself gay without fear of 
intervention by the police state.  Oddly, gay identities had to 
be expressed – had to become public, sexualized identities – in 
order for gays activists to demand that they no longer be 
criminalized for activity that takes place in private.  In other 
words, we had to say that we were criminals – that we engaged in 
homosexual sex – in order to become free of criminal 
restrictions on the expressions of our identities – our most 
personal choices. 
 Through the history of challenging sodomy laws in the 
courts, gay legal advocates have continued to return to this 
public sphere to gain visibility, and by doing so, to gain the 
protection of the Court which has been provided to other 
minority groups.  Often rebuffed, they went to state courts and 
state legislatures and returned to the Supreme Court, in which 
their argument was finally heard. 
 
The Road Ahead: The Impact of Decriminalization 
 William Eskridge identifies a number of changes in the 
codificiation of identities that could result from the Court’s 
decision in Lawrence and Garner v. Texas (due to the fact that 
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the decision reversed the Court’s prior ruling in Bowers v. 
Hardwick).  Public policies relying on Hardwick were 
implemented.  For instance, the military uses its prohibitions 
against sodomy to buttress its argument that gay people should 
not serve in the military.  Many arrests for sex in public are 
based on sodomy laws; police departments will likely have to 
rethink arrests for “soliciting decoy cops for private sex” 
(170).   
The decision may also help feminists and gay legal 
theorists advance the notion that “sex is good and normal when 
participants welcome it, when the sex is truly a joint 
enterprise meeting the needs of the partners” (171).  Hardwick 
questioned the validity of this notion.  Furthermore, to return 
to the public health issue, overturning Hardwick might encourage 
more people to be tested for HIV (172).  Most significantly, the 
decision may have an adverse impact on discrimination against 
gay people.  Eskridge argues that as long as sodomy laws were on 
the books, employers and others in power (like landlords) could 
cloak their discrimination in a focus on the act.  They were 
regulating conduct versus discriminating against a group of 
people.  Since the conduct is no longer criminal, it is no 
longer subject to regulation.  Gay people can go public in a new 
way, without fear of criminal prosecution, but more 
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interestingly, gay men can be secure in their private intimate 
relations. 
This chapter chronicled the change in gay strategies within 
the legal, public sphere in the United States – a change in 
strategies tied to the performance of gays as persons. A longer 
term view does indeed seem to suggest that gay people are more 
successful in legal challenges to antigay laws when a majority 
of the public approves of the challenge.  Still, immediately 
after the Bowers decision, the American public in overwhelming 
majority believed that states should not have the right to 
regulate sexual practices conducted in private between 
consenting adult homosexuals (Murdoch and Price 332).  If we 
take Paul Smith’s arguments before the court in the Texas case 
as true, the public’s general opinion did not change over some 
17 years. 
 Irrespective of whether the indeterminate public at-large 
agreed with the Court’s decision or not, the work of gay legal 
activists since (at least) 1986 is indicative, I think, of Nancy 
Fraser’s theory of the subaltern counter-public.  The need to be 
free of restrictions on individual personal liberties, liberties 
defined by the Court, was the politicized need.  Gay legal 
activists interpreted and re-interpreted this need in the legal, 
public sphere of the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America.  As has happened in so many other instances related to 
 163
subaltern counter-publics like women and African-Americans, the 
Supreme Court became the arbiter – between the need of the 
subaltern counter-public and the desire of the state (in spite 
of counterfactual evidence) to regulate based on majoritarian 
morality. 
In truth, other needs may be met by this one decision. Non-
gay people see a different future as a result of the decision.  
I already referenced the President’s panicked call for a 
constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage in fear of the 
“activist” judges (who, he argues, are writing new law – not 
interpreting existing law).  Justice Antonin Scalia sees another 
future.  In his dissenting opinion, he writes: 
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, 
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, 
bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in 
light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. 
Every single one of these laws is called into question by 
today’s decision. (Lawrence) 
In Scalia’s dissenting opinion, it becomes clear that he does 
not recognize homosexuals as a class subject to discrimination 
in the Texas Law. 
Justice Scalia may have been correct in warning of the 
slippery slope.  Legal challenges to marriage laws have already 
begun across the country.  Interestingly, however, many gay 
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people aren't quite sure that’s the best course of action.  The 
totalizing regime of the gay movement, at least since the goal 
became assimilation into the mainstream, tends to dismiss 
opinions of those who don’t agree with that overall goal.  On 
the other hand, perhaps totalizing is too strong a word.  The 
movement, since the beginning of gay activism, has been towards, 
I have argued, full citizenship.  Truly, the option to marry the 
person of one’s choice – even if one chooses not to – is 
something granted to the citizens of this country. 
Emboldened by its success in the Texas sodomy law case, the 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund has identified a series 
of goals for its next steps in the public, legal sphere.  The 
goals fall along the lines of parenting, marriage and 
relationship recognition, employment, and other areas of life 
(including youth, law enforcement, and community education).  
Among the goals are defending “gay parents who are told that 
they have to choose between living with their partners and 
living with their children;” challenging “government bans on 
providing protections and benefits to gay and lesbian partners;” 
pursuing “equal benefits for workers’ partners and families, 
both from government and private employers;” and fighting “for 
the right of LGBT students to be safe and out at school” 
(“Forging,” multiple pages).  Whether most gay people agree with 
the new direction of the movement or not, these issues are 
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issues around which the national gay and lesbian coalition has 




1 Not unlike its support of abortion rights advocacy, the 
American Civil Liberties Union has been a pro-gay advocate for 
the deregulation of sodomy.  On its website, the ACLU lists five 
instances where it has intervened to protect gays and lesbians 





HISTORICIZING CONTEMPORARY GAY PUBLIC IMAGING 
 
In this project, I critically examined the public imaging 
of gay people as part of the ultimate goal of the gay rights 
movement – full citizenship for gays.  This project represents 
what I will call the “process” of theory – that is, finding the 
use value of theory as a tool for social and cultural critique.  
A monolithic characterization of the needs of gay people spawns 
in-group contestation.  By critical examination (through the use 
of theoretical approaches) of the monolith and the in-group 
contestation it incites, gay academics can contribute to a 
further understanding and even, perhaps, a reconfiguration of 
public images (and messages) that may be more inclusive of 
multiple identities.   
 The in-group dissension and debate about the gay monolith 
and the postmodern work of dismantling categorical structures 
like identity prompts the proposal of a new theory of 
coalitional politics.  As individuals view their own identities 
in light of the monolithic image promoted by the larger group, 
they find elements that do not fit within their conception of 
their own identity.  Gay identities are not, then, fixed, stable 
images for public viewing; rather, they are as multiple as the 
individuals that form the membership of the gay community.  Gay 
political organizations can allow for this concept of multiple 
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identities while still agitating for political gain within the 
courts and the halls of the legislature.  In fact, the promotion 
of a multi-dimensional image of the gay male might encourage 
more participation from within the group. 
 The problem with postmodern approaches to identity – that 
postmodern understanding of identity leads to political inaction 
– is truly not a problem at all.  Groupings of people within 
subaltern counter-publics remain viable forces for political 
action, despite the fact that one group’s promoted identity may 
not effectively incorporate all of its members.  Groups form to 
protect the rights of individuals; the group – as a political 
union – does not seek rights for itself.  In legal language, 
rights are held by individuals; the group’s purpose is to ensure 
those rights are granted within our actually existing democracy. 
 Moreover, members of the group need not necessarily conform 
to its publicly performed image/identity in order to be 
benefited by the rights the group achieves.  For example, 
bisexuals like the ones mentioned in the introduction need not 
agree with the political aim of gay marriage or even with the 
mainstreaming of gay culture in order to be free from 
governmental interference in their bedroom.  Similarly, although 
transgendered people are not widely represented within the 
community, national political organizations do argue for their 
inclusion within hate crimes protections (“Local Law Enforcement 
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Enhancement Act” par. 1). To conclude my work, I will examine 
some problems with the monolithic identity currently being 
promoted within the public sphere, discuss the problem with 
creating contemporary histories, and end with some questions for 
the future. 
 
Gay People Are Not All Male, White, and Middle-Class 
 This subhead reads as a statement of fact.  In truth, 
however, the available public imaging of gay men encourages the 
mainstream culture to assume the opposite.  For example, take 
Will Truman – the character on the television series, Will and 
Grace.  Truman is an attorney who lives in an apartment in 
Manhattan, so he is clearly middle-class (and quite probably 
upper-class).  His education in law suggests his middle-class 
status, further setting him apart from gay men of other classes.  
With his quips (directed at his foil, Jack) one might interpret 
him as being relatively feminine.  He is white, and perhaps 
significantly, he is single – but clearly desires a long-term 
relationship.  In comparison to Will, Jack is effeminate, and 
although he is unemployed, he is not represented as being from a 
different economic class as Will. 
 I chose to briefly examine the Will Truman character 
because that image – presented every week – is indicative of the 
public imaging of gay men, generally.  Gay men are seen as 
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white, middle-class, highly-educated, moderately effeminate men.  
This monolithic image erases those of a lower class (as does the 
focus on Shepard), those who are African-American or have 
another race or ethnicity, and those who want to characterize 
themselves as masculine.  The examination of identity 
performances (in the form of public imaging) is not, of course, 
as simple as this examination of one character would suggest.  
There are places in popular culture, for instance, where 
African-American gay males are depicted, but they are most often 
confined to the role of the “gay best friend” or the overly 
effeminate man.  The depiction of gay men from lower economic 
classes is almost insignificant.1   
 
The Problem with “Contemporary Histories” 
 
 In this study, I have worked to create a “contemporary” 
history of the strategies and tactics used in the creation/ 
performance of the public image of the gay community.  Gay 
public imaging has changed since the shocking drag queen image 
seen at Southern Decadence in 1972.  The death of Matthew 
Shepard occurred in the beginning of the most recent phase of 
gay political activism, a phase in which gay political leaders 
seek to highlight the similarities of the gay community to the 
mainstream public.  The continuing legal strategy of the 
community is one that, at some point, will result in gay men and 
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lesbians having the right to marry one another.  In 
historicizing each of these three events, I examined the 
cultural factors that helped form gay image making. 
In my work on this study, I have discovered one major 
difficulty with contemporary histories.  The history of the 
public image of gay people and its attendant political 
consequences is still being written.  While I worked on this 
project, the Supreme Court refused to entertain a case from 
Massachusetts contesting the ruling of that state’s Supreme 
Court which effectively legalized gay marriage for 
Massachusetts’ citizens.  ABC News journalist Elizabeth Vargas 
reported a story in which she claimed there was new evidence to 
suggest “Shepard knew McKinney well before the murder, that 
McKinney was bisexual, and that Shepard was a ‘party boy’ 
addicted to meth” (Graham, par. 8).  I saw a rerun of a Law & 
Order: Special Victims Unit episode in which the assistant 
district attorney references the gay panic defense used at the 
Matthew Shepard murder trial and her boss references the 
Lawrence decision (“Abomination”).  In the episode, a young 
man’s religious father attempted to use the defense in order to 
justify his killing of the young man’s lover. Southern Decadence 
continues each Labor Day weekend, and each year brings a new 
twist to the festivities.   
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Perhaps the ongoing, continuing dialogue between gay people 
and the mainstream will continue for the foreseeable future and 
more public images of gay people will performed – exploding the 
monolith.  While there must be progress towards that goal, I am 
reminded of the relative silence of pre-Stonewall gay men and 
lesbians; yes, they existed, but their lives were hidden from 
public view.  Now, gay people live openly and actively work to 
promote their rights as citizens of the United States. 
 
The Future of Gay Identities: Some Questions 
The work continues, but I am reminded of the difficult 
issues examination of public imaging raises. Does citizenship 
really require that we forget about the leatherman, for 
instance, and his more open attitudes towards sexuality?  Can we 
incorporate the leatherman’s (or -woman’s) desire for 
sadomasochistic sexual activities into the normalized regime of 
gay and lesbian sexualities?  What does citizenship mean for our 
safe spaces – the cities that served as birthing places for our 
entire movement?  Do they simply become tourist destinations – 
where suburban and rural queers come to explore a fetishized 
queerness?  What does citizenship mean for the kinds of shocking 
performance identified in the very earliest parts of our 
movement?  Must we change the entire character of the movement 
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in order to promote the more conservative (assimilationist) 
social agenda? 
The project of marking down the contemporary history of the 
gay political movement, with all its attendant contradictions, 
continues.  Finally, I think the inability to conclude such a 
history is the contribution of the poststructuralists to the 
question of identities.  No, there is no ONE gay identity in 
which we can all find ourselves.  Rather, our identities are as 
many as the members of the community.  We organize around 
political aims – not around a singular vision of what it means 




1 I should also point out that my focus in this project has been 
almost exclusive on the public identity performances of gay men; 
lesbians are publicly imaged, but I have not researched those 
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